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Recently it has been shown that quantum cryptography beyond pure entanglement distillation
is possible and a paradigm for the associated protocols has been established. Here we systemati-
cally generalize the whole paradigm to the multipartite scenario. We provide constructions of new
classes of multipartite bound entangled states, i.e., those with underlying twisted GHZ structure
and nonzero distillable cryptographic key. We quantitatively estimate the key from below with help
of the privacy squeezing technique.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum cryptography is one of the most successful
applications of quantum physics in information theory.
The original pioneering BB84 scheme [1] was based on
sending nonorthogonal states through an insecure quan-
tum channel. Then the alternative approach (E91) [2]
based on generating key from pure entangled quantum
state have been proposed and later extended to the case
of mixed states in quantum privacy amplification scheme
[3] which exploited the idea of distillation of pure entan-
gled quantum states from more copies of noisy entangled
(mixed) states [4]. Much later it was realized that actu-
ally existence of (may be noisy) initial entanglement in
the state is necessary for any type of protocols distilling
secret key from quantum states [5, 6]. In a meantime the
problem of unconditional security (security in the most
unfriendly scenario when the eavesdropper may apply ar-
bitrarily correlated measurements on the sent particles
or, in the entanglement distillation scheme, distribute
many particles in a single entangled quantum state) was
further solved in Ref. [7] in terms of entanglement distil-
lation showing equivalence between the two (BB84 and
E91) ideas (see Ref. [8] for an alternative proof). How-
ever, still the protocol worked only for entanglement that
could be distilled. Also, other protocols [9, 10] that ex-
ploited a modern approach to secrecy (based on classical
notions) also were used in cases when pure entanglement
was distillable. It was known, however, for a relatively
long time that there are states (called bound entangled)
that can not be distilled to pure form [11]. In the above
context it was quite natural to expect that bound en-
tangled states cannot lead to private key. However, it
happens not to be true [12]: one can extend the entan-
glement distillation idea from distillation of pure states to
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distillation of private states (in general mixed states that
contain a private bit) and further show that there are ex-
amples of bound entangled states from which secure key
can be distilled. A general paradigm has been systemat-
ically worked out in Refs. [13, 14] with further examples
of bound entangled states with secure key [15, 16] and
interesting applications [17, 18, 19]. From the quantum
channels perspective the extended scheme [12] represents
secure key distillation with help of a quantum channel
with vanishing quantum capacity (i.e., it is impossible to
transmit qubit states faithfully). Those channels [12, 16]
were later used in the discovery [20] of the drastically non
intuitive, fully nonclassical effect of mutual activation of
zero capacity channels, which ”unlock” each other allow-
ing to transmit quantum information faithfully if encoded
into entanglement across two channels inputs. On the
other hand with help of the seminal machinery exploiting
the notion of almost productness in unconditionally se-
cure quantum key distillation [21] it has been shown that
unconditional security under channels that do not con-
vey quantum information is possible [22]. Here we would
like to stress that we focus on the approach to quantum
cryptography based on private states rather than the, to
some extent, complementary information–theoretic ap-
proach which has also been proven very fruitful (see Refs.
[9, 21, 23, 24, 25]).
The results discussed above concern bipartite states.
The aim of the present paper, which, among others, con-
cludes part of the analysis of [26], is to develop the general
approach to distillation of secure key from multipartite
states. Basically the content of the paper can be divided
into two parts. In the first part we systematically and in
a consistent way generalize the approach from Ref. [13].
Here the basic notion of multipartite p–dits that has been
introduced and analyzed already in the previous paper
[27].
It should be stressed here that, as extensively discussed
in [14], other modifications of the paradigm are possible
as far as the so–called notion of ”direct accessibility of
cryptographic key” is considered. The p–dit approach is
2based on local von Neumann measurements, while it is
possible also to consider local POVM–s [17]. Both ap-
proaches (and additional one) were proved to be equiva-
lent in terms of the amount of distillable key contained in
a given bipartite state in Ref. [14]. While we leave this
issue for further analysis we strongly believe that the ab-
stract proofs of the latter work naturally extend to our
multipartite case.
The first part of the present paper contains qualita-
tively new elements like conditions for closeness to a p–
dit state which were not known so far, and a derivation of
a lower bound for multipartite key where an additional
analysis of distance to so–called cq states was needed.
The second part of the paper contains constructions of
novel states ie. multipartite states that contain secure
key though are bound entangled. The states are based
on the underlying (twisted) N–partite GHZ structure
and are PPT under any N − 1 versus one system par-
tial transpose. The secret key content is bounded from
below quantitatively with help of the technique adopted
form [16].
More specifically after basic definitions and a general-
ization of the modern definition (that has already become
standard) of secure key distillation from quantum state
in Sec. II we pass to Sec. III where the notion of mul-
tipartite private–dit state (in short p–dit) and its prop-
erties are discussed including especially the condition for
ǫ−closeness to a p–dit. Distillable cryptographic key in
terms of p-dits is analyzed in section IV. Here an upper
bound in terms of relative entropy is proved in analogy
to the bipartite case. A lower bound on the key based on
a modification of the one–way Devetak–Winter protocol
[9, 10] to the multipartite case is provided with help of
a natural lemma with a somewhat involved proof. Also
the application [16] of privacy squeezing [12] is naturally
extended and applied here.
The next section is the longest one since it contains
all the constructions of multipartite bound entanglement
with cryptographic key. Note that the first construction,
being an extension and modification of bipartite exam-
ples from Ref. [15], requires nontrivial coincidence of sev-
eral conditions that are contained in Lemma V.3. They
ensure that, on the one hand the state is PPT, but on
the other it allows to be modified by the LOCC recur-
rence protocol to a state that is close to a multipartite
p–dit. This is equivalent to distillability. Independently,
a quantitative analysis is performed illustrating how the
lower bound for distillable key becomes positive. The
second class of bound entangled states (to some extent
inspired by bipartite four–qubit states from [16]) involves
hermitian unitary block elements of the density matrix.
Here the construction is different and, in comparison to
the first one, the observed secure key is much stronger.
Finally we shortly recall the limitations of quantum cryp-
tography [33, 35]. Section VI contains conclusions.
II. BASIC NOTIONS AND THE STANDARD
DEFINITION OF SECURE KEY
In what follows we shall be concerned with the scenario
in which N parties A1, . . . , AN wish to obtain perfectly
correlated strings of bits (or in general dits) that are com-
pletely uncorrelated to the eavesdropper Eve by means
of local operations and public communication (LOPC).
Let us recall that the difference between the standard lo-
cal operations and classical communication (LOCC) and
LOPC lies in the fact that in the latter we need to remem-
ber that any classical message announced by the involved
parties may be registered by Eve. Therefore in compar-
ison to the LOCC paradigm in the LOPC paradigm one
also includes the map (see e.g. Refs. [13, 19])
̺AA′BE =
∑
i
̺
(i)
ABE ⊗ |i〉〈i|A′−→ ̺AA′BB′EE′
=
∑
i
̺
(i)
ABE ⊗ |i〉〈i|A′ ⊗ |i〉〈i|B′ ⊗ |i〉〈i|E′ , (1)
From the quantum cryptographic point of view the com-
mon aim of all the parties A1, . . . , AN is to distill the
following state
̺
(N,id)
AE =
1
d
d−1∑
i=0
|e(1)i . . . e(N)i 〉〈e(1)i . . . e(N)i | ⊗ ̺E , (2)
called hereafter ideal c...cq (cq) state, by means of LOPC.
Here A ≡ A1 . . . AN and {|e(j)i 〉}d−1i=0 is some orthonormal
basis in the Hilbert space corresponding to the jth party
(denoted hereafter by Hj). Their tensor product consti-
tutes the product basis in H1⊗ . . .⊗HN , which we shall
denote as
BprodN =
{
|e(1)i1 〉 ⊗ . . .⊗ |e
(N)
iN
〉
}d−1
i1,...,iN=0
. (3)
(In what follows we will be often assuming {|e(j)i 〉}d−1i=0 to
be the standard basis in Hj .) One sees that the ideal
cq states represent perfect classical correlations with re-
spect to the product basis BprodN that uncorrelated to the
eavesdropper’s degrees of freedom.
We may also define a general cq state to be
̺
(N,cq)
AE =
d−1∑
i1,...,iN=0
pi1...iN |e(1)i1 . . . e
(N)
iN
〉〈e(1)i1 . . . e
(N)
iN
|⊗̺Ei1...iN .
(4)
In the above considerations formula we could take differ-
ent dimensions on each side, however, for simplicity we
restrict to the case of equal dimensions. All the parties
should have strings of the same length at the end of the
protocol to make a key.
It should be also emphasized that in what follows the
jth party is assumed to have an additional ’garbage’
quantum system defined on some Hilbert space H′j . Thus
we will be assuming that usually the states shared by the
3parties are defined on the Hilbert space H ⊗ H′, where
H = H1⊗. . .⊗HN andH′ = H′1⊗. . .⊗H′N , BprodN consti-
tutes the product basis in H. Also, following Ref. [13],
the part of a given state corresponding to H (H′) will
be sometimes called the key part (the shield part). This
terminology comes from the fact that the key part is the
one from which the parties obtain the cryptographic key,
while the shield part protects secret correlation from the
eavesdropper.
Following e.g. Refs. [13, 19], using the notion of cq
states, we may define the distillable cryptographic key in
the multipartite scenario as follows.
Definition II.1. Let ̺AE be a state acting on Cd1 ⊗
. . . ⊗ CdN ⊗ CdE and (Pn)∞n=1 be a sequence of LOPC
operations such that Pn(̺
⊗n
AE) = ̺
(cq,n)
AE , where ̺
(cq,n)
AE is
a cq state with A part defined on
(
Cdn
)⊗N
. The set of
operations P = (Λn)
∞
n=1 is said to be a cryptographic key
distillation protocol if
lim
n→∞
∥∥∥̺(cq,n)AE − ̺(id,n)AE ∥∥∥
1
= 0, (5)
where ̺
(id,n)
AE is the ideal cq state defined on the same
Hilbert space as ̺
(cq,n)
AE . We define the rate of the protocol
P = (Pn)
∞
n=1 as
RP (̺AE) = lim sup
n→∞
log dn
n
(6)
and the distillable classical key as
CD(̺AE) = sup
P
RP (̺AE). (7)
If instead of ̺AE one has the purification |ψAE〉 we write
CD(̺A).
Let us also mention that a good indicator of the se-
crecy of our correlations as well as the uniformity of the
probability distribution pi1...iN is the trace norm distance∥∥̺(id)AE − ̺(cq)AE ∥∥1.
III. PRIVATE STATES
A. Definition and properties
Here we discuss the multipartite generalizations of two
important concepts of the scheme from Refs. [12, 13].
Firstly we introduce the notion of twisting and then the
notion of multipartite private states.
Definition III.1. Let (Ui1...iN )i1...iN be some family of
unitary operations acting on H′. Given the N–partite
product basis BprodN we define multipartite twisting to be
the unitary operation given by the following formula
Ut =
d−1∑
i1,...,iN=0
|e(1)i1 . . . e
(N)
iN
〉〈e(1)i1 . . . e
(N)
iN
| ⊗ Ui1...iN . (8)
This is an important notion since, as shown in the bipar-
tite case in Ref. [13] (Theorem 1) and as it holds also for
multipartite states, application of twisting (taken with
respect to the product basis BprodN ) to a given state ̺AA′
does not have any effect on the cq state obtained upon a
measurement of the A part of the purification of ̺AA′ in
the product basis BprodN . More precisely states ̺AA′ and
Ut̺AA′U
†
t have the same cq state with respect to BprodN
for any twisting that is constructed using BprodN .
We can now pass to the notion of multipartite private
states. These are straightforward generalization of pri-
vate states from Refs. [12, 13] and were defined already
in Ref. [27].
Definition III.2. Let Ui be some unitary operations
for every i and let ̺A′ be a density matrix acting on H′.
By multipartite private state or multipartite pdit we mean
the following
Γ
(d)
AA′ =
1
d
d−1∑
i,j=0
|e(1)i . . . e(N)i 〉〈e(1)j . . . e(N)j | ⊗Ui̺A′U †j . (9)
Naturally, for N = 2 the above reproduces the bipar-
tite private states γ
(d)
A1A2A′1A
′
2
introduced in Ref. [13]. It
follows from the definition that any multipartite private
state may be written as Γ
(d)
AA′ = Ut(P
(+)
d,N ⊗ ̺A′)U †t with
̺A′ and Ut denoting some density matrix acting on H′
and some twisting, respectively. Moreover, P
(+)
d,N stands
for the projector onto the so–called GHZ state [28] given
by
|ψ(+)d,N 〉 =
d−1∑
i=0
|i〉⊗N . (10)
In other words we say that multipartite private states are
twisted GHZ states tensored with an arbitrary density
matrix ̺A′ .
As a simple but illustrative example of a multipartite
pdit one may consider the following (2D)N×(2D)N state
(with H = (C2)⊗N and H′ = (CD)⊗N )
Γ(2)ex =
1
2DN

1DN 0 . . . V
(D)
π
0 0 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
V
(D)†
π 0 . . . 1DN

=
1
2DN
[(|0〉〈0|⊗N + |1〉〈1|⊗N)⊗ 1DN
+
(|0〉〈1|⊗N + |1〉〈0|⊗N)⊗ V (D)π ] . (11)
where V
(D)
π is a permutation operator defined as
V (D)π =
D−1∑
i1,...,iN=0
|i1〉〈iπ(1)| ⊗ |i2〉〈iπ(2)| ⊗ . . .⊗ |iN 〉〈iπ(N)|
(12)
4with π being an arbitrary permutation of N–element
set. Clearly V
(D)
π is unitary matrix for any permuta-
tion π and thus
∣∣V (D)π ∣∣ = 1DN (|A| is defined as √A†A).
This, in view of the Lemma A.1 (Appendix), means that
M2(1DN , V (D)π ) ≥ 0 (for the definition of M2 see Ap-
pendix) for any π and hence Γ
(2)
ex represents quantum
state. Moreover, Γ
(2)
ex may be derived from the general
form (9) by substituting ̺A′ = 1DN/D
N , i.e., maximally
mixed state acting on (CD)⊗N . Finally, both unitary op-
erations in Eq. (9) may be taken to be U0 = V
(D)
π and
U1 = 1DN .
As multipartite private state constitute a central no-
tion of our cryptographic scheme, below we shortly char-
acterize multipartite private states. Firstly, we notice
that any state of which cq state is the ideal one with re-
spect to some basis BN must be of the form (9) and vice
versa.
Theorem III.1. Let ̺AA′ be a state defined on H⊗H′
with H = (Cd)⊗N and arbitrary but finite–dimensional
H′. Let also ̺(cq)AE denote the cq state obtained from the
purification of ̺AA′ upon the measurement of the A part
in BprodN and tracing out the A′ part. Then ̺(cq)AE is of the
form (2) if and only if ̺AA′ is of the form (9), both with
respect to BprodN .
This fact may be proved in exactly the same way as its
bipartite version from Ref. [13].
Secondly, it was shown in Ref. [27] that any multi-
partite private state is distillable providing also a lower
bound on distillable entanglement. For completeness it is
desirable to briefly recall this result, which can be stated
as follows. For any multipartite private state Γ
(d)
AA′
its
distillable entanglement is bounded as
ED
(
Γ
(d)
AA′
) ≥
max
i,j=0,...,d−1
i<j
amaxij
1−H
1
2
+
ηij
2
√
a
(1)
ij a
(2)
ij

(13)
where ηij , a
(1)
ij , a
(1)
ij , and finally a
max
ij are parameters
characterizing the given private state Γ
(d)
AA′
. They are
defined as follows
ηij = max
∣∣∣〈f1| . . . 〈fN |Ui̺A′U †j |g1〉 . . . |gN〉∣∣∣ , (14)
where maximum is taken over a pair of pure product vec-
tors |f1〉 . . . |fN 〉 and |g1〉 . . . |gN 〉 belonging to H′. The
parameters a
(1)
ij and a
(2)
ij are given by
a
(1)
ij = 〈f˜ (ij)1 | . . . 〈f˜ (ij)N |Ui̺A′U †i |f˜ (ij)1 〉 . . . |f˜ (ij)N 〉 (15)
and
a
(2)
ij = 〈g˜(ij)1 | . . . 〈g˜(ij)N |Uj̺A′U †j |g˜(ij)1 〉 . . . |g˜(ij)N 〉, (16)
where |f˜ (ij)1 〉 . . . |f˜ (ij)N 〉 and |g˜(ij)1 〉 . . . |g˜(ij)N 〉 are the vectors
realizing the maximum in Eq. (14). Finally amaxij denotes
the larger of two numbers a
(1)
ij and a
(2)
ij .
It follows from Eqs. (14), (15), and (16) that ηij is
always positive and on the other hand ηij ≤
√
a
(1)
ij a
(2)
ij .
This means that amaxij > 0 and consequently for any pair
(i < j) the expression under the maximum in Eq. (13)
is positive proving that ED of any multipartite private
state is nonzero.
Finally, we notice following Ref. [27] that for bipar-
tite private states also other entanglement measures were
bounded from below. Namely, it was shown that
EC(γ
(d)
A1A2A′1A
′
2
) ≥ log d (17)
and, due to the fact that entanglement of formation is not
smaller than the entanglement cost, EF (γ
(d)
A1A2A′1A
′
2
) ≥
log d.
B. Conditions for closeness to multipartite private
states
Here we provide necessary and sufficient conditions al-
lowing for judging how close to some multipartite private
state is some given state ̺AA′ defined on H⊗H′.
Let us firstly notice that any state acting on H ⊗ H′
may be written in the following block form
̺AA′ =
d−1∑
i1,...,iN=0
d−1∑
j1,...,jN=0
|i1 . . . iN〉〈j1 . . . jN | ⊗ Ωj1...jNi1...iN ,
(18)
where Ωj1...jNi1...iN are assumed to be square matrices de-
fined on H′. Also by ˜̺A we denote the state ˜̺A =
TrA′(Ut̺AA′U
†
t ) with some twisting Ut, and by (˜̺A)j1...jNi1...iN
its entries in the standard basis. Then we can prove the
following useful lemma.
Lemma III.1. Let ̺AA′ be some density matrix act-
ing on H ⊗ H′ with H = (Cd)⊗N and arbitrary finite–
dimensional H′. Then there exists such twisting Ut
that for a fixed index i all the elements (˜̺A)j...ji...i and
(˜̺A)i...ij...j (j = 0, . . . , d − 1) of the i–th row and column
of ˜̺A = TrA′(Ut̺AA′U †t ) equal ∥∥Ωj...ji...i ∥∥1 and ∥∥Ωi...ij...j∥∥1,
respectively.
Proof. The proof is a simple extension of the one pre-
sented in Ref. [13]. Acting on the state ̺AA′ with an
unitary twisting Ut and tracing out the A
′ subsystem,
one gets
˜̺A = d−1∑
i1,...,iN=0
d−1∑
j1,...,jN=0
Tr
(
Ui1...iNΩ
j1...jN
i1...iN
U †j1...jN
)
×|i1 . . . iN〉〈j1 . . . jN |. (19)
First of all let us mention that from Eq. (19) it follows
that we do not need to care about blocks lying on the
5diagonal of ̺AA′ as the blocks Ω
i1...iN
i1...iN
must be positive
and the following holds
Tr
(
Ui1...iNΩ
i1...iN
i1...iN
U †i1...iN
)
=
∥∥Ωi1...iNi1...iN∥∥1 . (20)
Now, let us focus now on the matrices Ωj...ji...i for some
fixed i and any j 6= i (as the case of i = j has just
been discussed). For simplicity and without any loss of
generality we can choose i = 0 and thus we need to prove
the theorem for j = 1, . . . , d− 1. At the beginning let us
concentrate on the matrix Ω1...10...0. We can express it with
the singular–value decomposition as Ω1...10...0 = V1D1W
†
1 ,
where V1 and W1 are unitary matrices and D1 stands
for a diagonal matrix containing singular values of Ω1...10...0,
i.e., eigenvalues of
∣∣Ω1...10...0∣∣. Then from Eq. (19) one infers
that it suffices to take U0...0 = V
†
1 and U1...1 =W in the
twisting Ut to get
Tr
(
U0...0Ω
1...1
0...0U
†
1...1
)
=Tr(V †V DW †W )
=TrD =
∥∥Ω1...10...0∥∥1 . (21)
Now we may proceed with the remaining matrices Ωj...j0...0
(j = 2, . . . , d − 1). We need to find such matrices in the
twisting Ut that Eq. (21) holds also for the remaining
Ωj...j0...0. Notice that unitary matrices U0...0 and U1...1 have
just been fixed, however, we have still some freedom pro-
vided by Uj...j (j = 2, . . . , d−1). Using the singular value
decomposition of all Ωj...j0...0 (j = 2, . . . , d−1) we may write
Ωj...j0...0 = VjDjW
†
j . This leads to
Tr
(
U0...0Ω
j...j
0...0U
†
j...j
)
=Tr
(
V †Ωj...j0...0U
†
j...j
)
=Tr
(
V †VjDjW
†
j U
†
j...j
)
=Tr
(
DjW
†
j U
†
j...jV
†Vj
)
, (22)
where we used the property of trace saying that TrAB =
TrBA. It is clear from the above that to get the trace
norm of Ωj...j0...0 for any j = 2, . . . , d−1 it suffices to choose
Uj...j in such way that W
†
j U
†
j...jV
†
1 Vj = 1. This means
that Uj...j = V
†
1 VjW
†
j (j = 2, . . . , d − 1). The remaining
Ui1...iN appearing in the definition of Ut may be chosen
at will. Concluding we showed that there exists such
Ut that for a fixed i it holds that (˜̺A)j...ji...i = ∥∥Ωj...ji...i ∥∥1
(j = 0, . . . , d− 1). The fact that also (˜̺A)i...ij...j = ∥∥Ωj...ji...i ∥∥1
follows obviously from hermiticity of ˜̺A.
This is a very useful lemma due to the fact that twist-
ings do not change the cq state. It allows us to concen-
trate on a particular form of a given state ̺AA′ . In other
words, we can think about the state ̺AA′ as if it has such
a reduction to A subsystem that some of its elements in
fixed row or column are trace norms of respective blocks
of ̺AA′ (obviously with respect to the same product basis
BprodN ). As an illustrative example we can consider ̺AA′
with d = 2. Then from Eq. (18) it can be written as
̺AA′ =

Ω0...00...0 Ω
0...1
0...0 . . . Ω
1...1
0...0
Ω0...00...1 Ω
0...1
0...1 . . . Ω
1...1
0...1
...
...
. . .
...
Ω0...01...1 Ω
0...1
1...1 . . . Ω
1...1
1...1
 , (23)
where Ωj1...iNi1...iN =
(
Ωi1...iNj1...jN
)†
and Ωi1...iNi1...iN ≥ 0 for any
ik, jk = 0, 1. In view of Lemma 3.2 the above may be
brought to the following state
˜̺A≡TrA′(Ut̺AA′U †t )
=

∥∥Ω0...00...0∥∥1 (˜̺A)0...10...0 . . . ∥∥Ω1...10...0∥∥1
(˜̺A)0...00...1 ∥∥Ω0...10...1∥∥1 . . . (˜̺A)1...10...1
...
...
. . .
...∥∥Ω0...01...1∥∥1 (˜̺A)0...11...1 . . . ∥∥Ω1...11...1∥∥1
 . (24)
Now we are prepared to provide the aforementioned
conditions for closeness to multipartite private states (the
bipartite case was discussed in Ref. [13]). Firstly we show
that if a given ̺AA′ is close to some multipartite pdit then
(due to the above lemma) there exist such Ut that the
A subsystem has all the elements (TrA′Ut̺AA′U
†
t )
j...j
i...i =∥∥Ωj...ji...i ∥∥1 for j = 0, . . . , d− 1 close to 1/d.
Theorem III.2. Let Ωj1...jNi1...iN be some matrices and
̺AA′ be an N–partite state of the form (18) such that∥∥̺AA′ − Γ(d)AA′∥∥1 ≤ ǫ for some multipartite private state
Γ
(d)
AA′
for some ǫ > 0. Then for a fixed index i one has∣∣∥∥Ωj...ji...i ∥∥1− (1/d)∣∣ ≤ ǫ and ∣∣∥∥Ωi...ij...j∥∥1− (1/d)∣∣ ≤ ǫ for any
j = 0, . . . , d− 1.
Proof. The proof is a modification of the one given
in Ref. [13] (Proposition 3). Let Γ
(d)
AA′
be such a private
state that
∥∥̺AA′ − Γ(d)AA′∥∥1 ≤ ǫ and Ut be such twisting
that Γ
(d)
AA′
= Ut(P
(+)
d,N ⊗ σA′)U †t with σA′ denoting some
state on H′. Then, due to the invariance of the trace
norm under unitary operations, we have∥∥∥U †t ̺AA′Ut − P (+)d,N ⊗ σA′∥∥∥
1
≤ ǫ. (25)
Now, utilizing the fact that the trace norm can only de-
crease under the partial trace, we get∥∥∥˜̺A − P (+)d,N∥∥∥
1
≤ ǫ, (26)
where ˜̺A is of the form (19). Notice that in general Ut
does not have to be the one bringing ˜̺A to the form dis-
cussed in Lemma III.1. After application of the explicit
form of P
(+)
d,N and ˜̺A given by Eq. (19), one can rewrite
6the above as∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
d−1∑
i1,...,iN=0
j1,...,jN=0
|i1 . . . iN 〉〈j1 . . . jN |Tr
(
Ui1...iNΩ
j1...jN
i1...iN
U †j1...jN
)
−1
d
d−1∑
i,j=0
|i〉〈j|⊗N
∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ ǫ. (27)
Now we may utilize the fact that for anyA =
∑
ij aij |i〉〈j|
square of its Hilbert–Schmidt norm is given by ‖A‖22 =∑
ij |aij |2 and that ‖A‖2 ≤ ‖A‖1. Therefore, if ‖A‖2 ≤ ǫ
for some ǫ > 0 then one infers that any of its elements
obeys |aij | ≤ ǫ (i, j = 0, . . . , d − 1). This reasoning,
after application to the matrix ˜̺A−P (+)d,N , leads us to the
conclusion that for any i, j = 0, . . . , d− 1 it holds∣∣∣∣Tr(Ui...iΩj...ji...i U †j...j)− 1d
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ, (28)
which eventually gives |Tr(Ui...iΩj...ji...i U †j...j)| ≥ 1/d −
ǫ. This, after application of the polar decomposition
of Ωj...ji...i and properties of trace can be rewritten as
|Tr(Wij |Ωj...ji...i |)| ≥ 1/d − ǫ with Wij being some unitary
matrix. Now, applying the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality
to the Hilbert–Schmidt scalar product we can infer that
for any positive A and unitary W the following chain of
inequalities holds
|Tr (WA)| =
∣∣∣Tr(W√A√A)∣∣∣
≤
√
Tr
(
W
√
A
√
AW †
)√
Tr
√
A
√
A
= TrA = ‖A‖1. (29)
Thus we have that ‖Ωj...ji...i ‖1 ≥ 1/d − ǫ for any (i, j =
0, . . . , d− 1).
On the other hand we can apply such twisting U˜t that
after application to ̺AA′ and tracing out the A
′ subsystem
we get ˜̺A such that in its ith row (or column) (˜̺A)j...ji...i =
‖Ωj...ji...i ‖ for j = 1, . . . , d − 1. Then, one easily concludes
that ∥∥∥˜̺AA′ − U˜ †t Γ(d)AA′ U˜t∥∥∥
1
≤ ǫ (30)
with ˜̺AA′ = U˜t̺AA′ U˜ †t . After the analogous reasoning as
in the previous case we get∣∣∣∣∥∥∥Ωj...ji...i ∥∥∥1 − 1dTr(W˜ijσA′)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ (31)
for some chosen i and j = 0, . . . , d − 1. Here by Wij we
denoted all product of the respective unitary matrices
following from product of U˜t and Ut. Using the fact that
|z1 − z2| ≥ |z1| − |z2|, we infer from the above inequality
that ∥∥∥Ωj...ji...i ∥∥∥
1
≤ ǫ+ 1
d
∣∣∣Tr(W˜ijσA′)∣∣∣ . (32)
It follows from the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality that the
absolute value on the right–hand side is not greater that
one. Thus we get the inequalities∥∥∥Ωj...ji...i ∥∥∥
1
≤ ǫ+ 1
d
(33)
for the chosen i and j = 0, . . . , d − 1. Joining this facts
together we get the desired result.
Notice that in the particular case of d = 2, discussed
already in Ref. [13] (Proposition 3), the only condi-
tion for
∥∥Ω1...10...0∥∥1 (and equivalently for ∥∥Ω0...01...1∥∥1) is that∥∥Ω1...10...0∥∥1 ≥ 1/2− ǫ. This is because, due to the fact that
Tr˜̺A = 1 and the positivity of ˜̺A ≥ 0 (and thus also of
the 2 × 2 matrix containing the elements ∥∥Ωj...ji...i ∥∥1 with
i, j = 0, 1)
∥∥Ω1...10...0∥∥1 ≤ 1/2.
Interestingly, one may prove also a converse statement,
namely if after applying respective twisting Ut, for some
fixed row, say the ith one, all
∥∥Ωj...ji...i ∥∥1 are close to 1/d,
then there exists some multipartite private state close to
a given state ̺AA′ .
Theorem III.3. Let ̺AA′ given by Eq. (18) be such that
for a fixed i the blocks Ωj...ji...i obey
∣∣∥∥Ωj...ji...i ∥∥1 − 1/d∣∣ ≤ ǫ
for any j = 0, . . . , d − 1 and 0 < ǫ < 1/d. Then there
exists such a multipartite private state Γ
(d)
AA′
that∥∥∥̺AA′ − Γ(d)AA′∥∥∥
1
≤
√
log 2
[
2N
√
dη(ǫ) log d+H(2
√
dη(ǫ))
]
+2
√
dη(ǫ), (34)
where η(ǫ) → 0 if ǫ → 0 and consequently the function
on the right–hand side tends to zero whenever ǫ → 0.
Here H denotes the binary entropy.
Proof. The proof is based on the one given in Ref.
[13]. Let Ut be such twisting that for fixed i it holds
of (˜̺A)j...ji...i = ∥∥Ωj...ji...i ∥∥1 (j = 0, . . . , d − 1). Then since
(˜̺A)j...ji...i = [(˜̺A)i...ij...j ]∗ with asterisk denoting complex
conjugation, the Hilbert–Schmidt scalar product of ˜̺A
and P
(+)
D,N may be expressed as
Tr˜̺AP (+)d,N = 1d
d−1∑
i,j=0
(˜̺A)j...ji...i
=
1
d
d−1∑
i=0
(˜̺A)i...ii...i + 2d
d−1∑
i,j=0
i<j
Re(˜̺A)j...ji...i . (35)
On the other hand from the positivity of ˜̺A one may
prove the following inequality
d−1∑
i=0
(˜̺A)i...ii...i ≥ 2d− 1
d−1∑
i,j=0
i<j
Re(˜̺A)j...ji...i , (36)
which after substitution to Eq. (35) gives
Tr˜̺AP (+)d,N ≥ 2d− 1
d−1∑
i,j=0
i<j
Re(˜̺A)j...ji...i . (37)
7Now we can utilize Lemma A.2 (see Appendix) to the
d × d matrix with entries (˜̺A)j...ji...i (i, j = 0, . . . , d − 1).
Namely, due to the assumption that for some fixed i the
elements (˜̺A)j...ji...i satisfy |(˜̺A)j...ji...i − 1/d| ≤ ǫ, we have
from Lemma A.2 that |(˜̺A)j...ji...i − 1/d| ≤ η(ǫ) for any
i, j = 0, . . . , d − 1 with η(ǫ) → 0 for ǫ → 0. This means
that the real parts of any (˜̺A)j...ji...i also satisfies the above
condition. In this light we get from Eq. (37) that
Tr˜̺AP (+)d,N ≥ 2d− 1
d−1∑
i,j=0
i<j
Re(˜̺A)j...ji...i
≥ 2
d− 1
d−1∑
i,j=0
i<j
(
1
d
− η(ǫ)
)
=
2
d− 1
d(d− 1)
2
(
1
d
− η(ǫ)
)
=1− dη(ǫ), (38)
where the first equality follows from the fact that the re-
spective sum contains d(d− 1)/2 elements. The remain-
der of the proof goes along the same line as its bipartite
version from Ref. [13] leading to the claimed inequality.
Notice that to prove the theorem for the particular case
of d = 2 it suffices to assume that
∥∥Ω1...10...0∥∥1 ≥ 1/2− ǫ.
Concluding we obtained necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for a given state ̺AA′ to be close to some multi-
partite private state expressed in terms of the trace norm
of some blocks of ̺AA′ (see Eq. (18)).
IV. DISTILLABLE CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY
A. Definition
Having introduced the concept of multipartite private
states we may pass to the definition of multipartite cryp-
tographic key. The seminal fact behind the notion of mul-
tipartite private states is that as shown in Refs. [12, 13],
one can think about quantum cryptography as a distilla-
tion of private states by means of LOCC. In other words,
we have a standard distillation scheme (as entanglement
distillation) in which we can forget about the eavesdrop-
per.
Definition IV.1. Let ̺A denote a given multipartite
state acting on Cd1 ⊗ . . .⊗CdN and (Λn)∞n=1 a sequence
of LOCC operations giving Λn(̺
⊗n
A ) = ̺
(n)
AA′
with ̺
(n)
AA′
be-
ing a state acting on (Cdn)⊗N ⊗H′n. Here H′n stands for
a finite–dimensional Hilbert space corresponding to the
A′ part of ̺
(n)
AA′
. Then we say that Λ = (Λn)
∞
n=1 is a mul-
tipartite private state distillation protocol if there exists
such a family of multipartite private states (Γ
(dn)
AA′
)∞n=1
that the condition
lim
n→∞
∥∥∥̺(n)AA′ − Γ(dn)AA′ ∥∥∥
1
= 0 (39)
holds. A rate of the protocol Λ is defined as RΛ(̺A) =
lim supn→∞[(1/n) log dn] and the distillable key as
KD(̺A) = sup
Λ
RΛ(̺A). (40)
As shown in the bipartite case in Ref. [13], both the
Definition II.1 and Definition IV.1 are equivalent in the
sense that if there exists LOCC protocol distilling some
multipartite private state there also exists LOPC pro-
tocol distilling the ideal ccq state (when purification is
considered) with the same rate. As the proof from Ref.
[13] may also be applied to the multipartite case, we pro-
vide the generalized version of the above fact below.
Theorem IV.1. The following two implications hold.
Assume that from a given state σA such that Eve has its
purification |ψAE〉 one may create by LOPC some cq state
̺
(cq)
AE (see Eq. (4)) obeying
∥∥̺(cq)AE − ̺(id)AE ∥∥1 ≤ ǫ for some
ǫ > 0 (recall that ̺
(id)
AE denotes the ideal cq state given by
Eq. (2)). Then there exists such LOCC protocol that can
distill a state ̺AA′ from σA that satisfies
∥∥̺AA′−Γ(d)AA′∥∥1 ≤
2
√
ǫ for some multipartite private state Γ
(d)
AA′
. On the
other hand if from σA one can distill a state ̺AA′ close to
some pdit Γ
(d)
AA′
, i.e., such that
∥∥̺AA′ − Γ(d)AA′∥∥1 ≤ ǫ then
there exists a LOPC protocol distilling from ̺A a cq state
such that
∥∥̺(cq)AE − ̺(id)AE ∥∥1 ≤ 2√ǫ. Each subsystem of the
A part of ̺
(cq)
AE and of the key part of Γ
(d)
AA′
is defined on
Cd.
Proof. The proof goes directly along the same lines as
the one from Ref. [13].
Interestingly, the distillable key KD may be used to
quantify entanglement among multipartite states. More
precisely, from the definition it follows that KD is mono-
tonic under the action of LOCC operations (see e.g. [29]).
Moreover, it vanishes on multipartite states that have
at least one separable cut, which is a consequence of
the straightforward multipartite generalization of the re-
sults from Ref. [5, 6] provided in Ref. [30]. Finally, as
we shall show the distillable key is normalized on GHZ
states P
(+)
d,N in the sense that KD(P
(+)
d,N ) = log d. How-
ever, firstly we need to provide two bounds on KD.
B. Bounds on the distillable key
The first bound is a simple multipartite generalization
of the upper bound provided in Ref. [13], while the sec-
ond bound is a consequence of a multipartite adaptation
of the Devetak–Winter protocol [9, 10]. Let us start from
the upper bound.
Theorem IV.2. Let ̺A be some N–partite state. Then
KD(̺A) ≤ E∞r (̺A), (41)
where E∞r (̺A) is a regularized version of the relative en-
tropy, i.e.,
E∞r (̺A) = limn→∞
1
n
inf
̺sep
A
∈D
S(̺⊗nA ‖̺sepA ) (42)
8and D denotes the set of all N–partite fully separable
states, i.e., states of the form
̺sepA =
∑
i
pi̺
(i)
A1
⊗ . . .⊗ ̺(i)AN . (43)
Proof. The proof is a generalization of the one from
Ref. [13].
Interestingly, we may also bound KD from below. For
this purpose we need to prove the following theorem.
Theorem IV.3. Let ̺
(cq)
AE be some multipartite cq state
acting on (Cd)⊗N ⊗ CdE and given by
̺
(cq)
AE =
d−1∑
i1,...,iN=0
pi1...iN |i1 . . . iN 〉〈i1 . . . iN |. (44)
Then it is arbitrarily close to the ideal cq state if and
only if for a chosen party Ai all the reductions to three–
partite systems AiAjE with j 6= i are arbitrarily close to
the bipartite ideal ccq state. More precisely, if
∥∥̺(cq)AE −
̺
(N,id)
AE
∥∥ ≤ ǫ holds for ǫ > 0, then for the fixed party Ai
the following inequalities∥∥∥∥∥∥
d−1∑
i1,...,iN=0
pi1...iN |iiij〉〈iiij | ⊗ ̺Ei1...iN − ̺(2,id)AE
∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ ǫ
(45)
are satisfied for j = 1, . . . , i− 1, i+1, . . . , N . Conversely,
assuming that for fixed Ai the inequalities (45) hold for
ǫ > 0 and j 6= i, one has∥∥∥̺(cq)AE − ̺(N,id)AE ∥∥∥
1
≤ (4N − 3)ǫ (46)
Proof. We proceed in two steps. In the first step we
show that if the trace norm distance between some mul-
tipartite cq state ̺
(cq)
AE and the ideal one is bounded by
some ǫ > 0 then any bipartite state arising by tracing out
N − 2 parties from the cq state is close to the bipartite
ideal ccq state. This part of the proof is relatively easy
since it suffices to utilize the fact that the trace norm
distance does not increase under the partial trace. The
proof of the converse statement is much more sophisti-
cated.
Let us assume that the following∥∥∥̺(cq)AE − ̺(N,id)AE ∥∥∥
1
≤ ǫ (47)
holds for some small ǫ > 0. Then since the trace norm
does not increase under the partial trace we have imme-
diately the following set of inequalities∥∥∥∥∥∥
d−1∑
i1,...,iN=0
pi1...iN |ikil〉〈ikil| ⊗ ̺Ei1...iN − ̺(2,id)AE
∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ ǫ
(48)
for any pair of indices k, l = 1, . . . , N . To end
the first part of the proof it suffices to substitute∑
I\{k,l} pi1...iN ̺
E
i1...iN
= qilik̺
E
i1...iN
, where summation
over I \ {k, l} means that we sum over all ij but ik and
il.
To proceed with the second part of the proof we assume
that one chosen party, say A1, shares with the remaining
N−1 parties a state that is close to the bipartite ideal cq
state. In other words we assume that for any j = 2, . . . , N
the following inequalities∥∥∥∥∥∥
d−1∑
i1,...,iN=0
pi1...iN |i1ij〉〈i1ij | ⊗ ̺Ei1...iN − ̺(2,id)AE
∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ ǫ
(49)
are satisfied. Basing on this set of inequalities we will
show that the left–hand side of Eq. (47) is bounded from
above by some linear function of ǫ vanishing for ǫ → 0.
For this purpose let us denote the left–hand side of Eq.
(47) by LHS and notice that it can be split into two
sums (see Eqs. (2) and (4)), namely the one containing
the elements for i1 = . . . = iN and the rest ones. In
this light, denoting by I the set of sequences (i1, . . . , iN )
obtained by removing all those with i1 = . . . = iN from
the set of all possible sequences, we can write
LHS =
∑
(i1,...,iN )∈I
pi1...iN +
d−1∑
i=0
∥∥∥∥pi...i̺Ei...i − 1d̺E
∥∥∥∥
1
≤
∑
(i1,...,iN )∈I
pi1...iN +
d−1∑
i=0
pi...i
∥∥̺Ei...i − ̺E∥∥1
+
d−1∑
i=0
∣∣∣∣pi...i − 1d
∣∣∣∣ , (50)
where the inequality comes from the fact that the term
pi...i̺
E
i...i was added and subtracted in the second term
in the first line and from the inequality ‖A + B‖1 ≤
‖A‖1 + ‖B‖1. The last equality is a simple consequence
of the fact that the trace norm of any density matrix
is just one. In what follows, using the inequalities (49),
we show that all the three terms appearing in the above
are bounded by linear functions of ǫ vanishing for ǫ→ 0.
With this aim, utilizing once more the fact that the trace
norm does not increase under the partial trace, we can
infer from Eq. (49) that∥∥∥∥∥∥
d−1∑
i1,...,iN=0
pi1...iN |i1ij〉〈i1ij | −
1
d
d−1∑
i=0
|ii〉〈ii|
∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ ǫ (51)
for j = 2, . . . , N . Now we can divide all the terms appear-
ing in the first sum into two groups, namely, the one for
i1 = ij and the remaining terms. This, after calculating
9the respective norms, leads to the following inequality
d−1∑
i=0
∣∣∣∣∣∣
d−1∑
i2,...,ij−1,ij+1,...,iN=0
pii2...ij−1iij+1...iN −
1
d
∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
d−1∑
i1,...,iN=0
i1 6=ij
pi1...iN ≤ ǫ. (52)
Obviously, since both terms in the above are nonnegative,
any of them must be less or equal to ǫ. This allows us to
write the inequalities
d−1∑
i=0
∣∣∣∣∣∣
d−1∑
i2,...,ij−1,ij+1,...,iN=0
pii2...ij−1iij+1...iN −
1
d
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ (53)
and
d−1∑
i1,...,iN=0
i1 6=ij
pi1...iN ≤ ǫ. (54)
From the sum appearing under the sign of an absolute
value in (53) we can extract the probability pi...i, obtain-
ing
d−1∑
i=0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣pi...i −
1
d
+
d−1∑
i2,...ij−1,ij+1,...,iN=0
(i2,...ij−1,ij+1,...,iN )∈Ii
pii2...ij−1iij+1...iN
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ,
(55)
where Ii denotes the strings of N − 2 indices
(i2, . . . , ij−1, ij+1, . . . , iN ) such that at least one of them
is different from i. Utilizing a simple inequality |z1−z2| ≥
|z1| − |z2| satisfied by all z1, z2 ∈ C, we get
d−1∑
i=0
∣∣∣∣pi...i − 1d
∣∣∣∣≤ ǫ+ d−1∑
i=0
∑
(i2,...,ij−1,ij+1,...,iN )∈Ii
pii2...ij−1iij+1...iN
= ǫ+
∑
(i1,...,iN )∈eIj
pi1......iN , (56)
where I˜j denotes the string of N indices such that the
first and jth ones are equal (i1 = ij) and at least one of
the remaining ones is different from i1. One sees that the
second term on the right–hand side of Eq. (56) may be
bounded from above in the following way
∑
(i1,...,iN )∈eIj
pi1...iN ≤
j−1∑
k=2
d−1∑
i1,...,iN=0
ik 6=i1
pi1...iN
+
N∑
k=j+1
d−1∑
i1,...,iN=0
ik 6=i1
pi1...iN
≤
j−1∑
k=2
ǫ +
N∑
k=j+1
ǫ
= (N − 2)ǫ, (57)
where the second inequality is a consequence of the in-
equality given in Eq. (54). Finally, application of Eq.
(57) to Eq. (56), gives
d−1∑
i=0
∣∣∣∣pi...i − 1d
∣∣∣∣ ≤ (N − 1)ǫ. (58)
This is a quite natural conclusion saying that if the mea-
surement outcomes between fixed party (here A1) and
each of the remaining ones are almost perfectly correlated
then the measurement outcomes are almost perfectly cor-
related among all the parties.
We have still two terms in Eq. (50) unbounded. Using
once again the inequality |z1 − z2| ≥ |z1| − |z2| (z1, z2 ∈
C) and the fact that pi1...iN represents some probability
distribution we may write
∑
(i1,...,iN )∈I
pi1...iN =1−
d−1∑
i=0
pi...i
≤ 1− [1− (N − 1)ǫ]
= (N − 1)ǫ. (59)
Thus, the only thing we need is to bound from above the
last term in Eq. (50). Remarkably, to achieve this aim it
suffices to utilize a single inequality from the whole set
(49), say the one for j = 2. The we can write
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∥∥∥∥∥∥
d−1∑
i1,...,iN=0
pi1...iN |i1i2〉〈i1i2| ⊗ ̺Ei1...iN −
1
d
d−1∑
i=0
|ii〉〈ii| ⊗ ̺E
∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
=
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
d−1∑
i=0
pi...i|ii〉〈ii| ⊗ ̺Ei...i −
1
d
d−1∑
i=0
|ii〉〈ii| ⊗ ̺E +
∑
(i1,...,iN )∈eI2
pi1...iN |i1i1〉〈i1i1| ⊗ ̺Ei1...iN +
d−1∑
i1,...,iN=0
i1 6=i2
pi1...iN |i1i2〉〈i1i2| ⊗ ̺Ei1...iN
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
.
(60)
Then, due to the fact that ‖A−B‖1 ≥ ‖A‖1 − ‖B‖1, we may rewrite the above as∥∥∥∥∥
d−1∑
i=0
pi...i|ii〉〈ii| ⊗ ̺Ei...i −
1
d
d−1∑
i=0
|ii〉〈ii| ⊗ ̺E
∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ ǫ+
∑
(i1,...,iN )∈eI2
pi1...iN +
d−1∑
i1,...,iN=0
i1 6=i2
pi1...iN
≤ ǫ+ (N − 2)ǫ+ ǫ = Nǫ, (61)
where the second inequality follows from Eqs. (52) and (57) (with j = 2). On the other hand, we can easily show
that ∥∥∥∥∥
d−1∑
i=0
pi...i|ii〉〈ii| ⊗ ̺Ei...i −
1
d
d−1∑
i=0
|ii〉〈ii| ⊗ ̺E
∥∥∥∥∥
1
≥
d−1∑
i=0
pi...i
∥∥̺Ei...i − ̺E∥∥1 − d−1∑
i=0
∣∣∣∣pi...i − 1d
∣∣∣∣ .
(62)
Comparison of Eqs. (58), (61) and (62) allows us to write
d−1∑
i=0
pi...i
∥∥̺Ei...i − ̺E∥∥1≤Nǫ+ d−1∑
i=0
∣∣∣∣pi...i − 1d
∣∣∣∣
≤Nǫ+ (N − 1)ǫ
=(2N − 1)ǫ. (63)
Putting now all the pieces together, that is, substituting Eqs. (58), (59), and (63) to Eq. (50), we finally have∥∥∥∥∥∥
d−1∑
i1,...,iN=0
pi1...iN |i1 . . . iN〉〈i1 . . . iN | ⊗ ̺Ei1...iN −
1
d
d−1∑
i=0
|i〉〈i|⊗N ⊗ ̺E
∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ (4N − 3)ǫ. (64)
Noting that for fixed N it holds that (4N − 3)ǫ → 0
whenever ǫ→ 0 we finish the proof.
It should be mentioned that as it follows from the sec-
ond part of the proof, we do not need to assume the whole
set of inequalities given in (49). Actually it suffices to as-
sume that a single inequality from the set (49) holds and
the remaining ones from the set given in Eq. (51). In
other words it suffices to assume that the measurement
outcomes between a fixed party and any from the other
parties are almost perfectly correlated and that Eve is
almost completely uncorrelated from the measurement
outcomes of a single pair. This is in full agreement with
our intuition. Namely, if the measurement outcomes of
any pair AiAj (with fixed i and arbitrary j 6= i) are per-
fectly correlated and Eve has a full knowledge about the
measurement outcomes of just a single party, she actu-
ally has the knowledge about measurement outcomes of
all parties. Therefore if all the parties have perfect corre-
lations and Eve is completely uncorrelated from a single
party, she must be completely uncorrelated from all the
parties. Consequently, it is sufficient to assume that a
single pair shares state that is close to a ccq state and
other chosen pairs have almost perfect correlations.
Now we are prepared to provide a lower bound on the
multipartite distillable key in the LOPC paradigm. We
achieve this by extending of the Devetak–Winter protocol
to the multipartite case. We do this by applying the bi-
partite Devetak–Winter protocol to N−1 pairs of parties
in some state ̺AE such that each of them consist of one
chosen party, say A1, and one of the remaining ones. Ev-
erything works as in the standard Devetak–Winter proto-
col, i.e., the party A1 performs the measurement in some
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basis, e.g. the standard one obtaining the so–called cq
state (classical–quantum–. . .–quantum)
̺
(cq)
AE =
∑
i
pi|i〉〈i|A1 ⊗ ̺(i)A2...ANE . (65)
Then, roughly speaking, the party A1 performs the
Devetak–Winter protocol with the remaining parties si-
multaneously. One knows that the correlation between
A1 and the remaining parties Aj (j = 2, . . . , N) are de-
scribed by the mutual information I(A1 : Aj)(̺
(cqq)
A1AjE
).
However, the establish common multipartite key we
need to consider the worst case, i.e., minj=2,...,N I(A1 :
Aj)(̺
(cqq)
A1AjE
). On the other hand, the correlation be-
tween A1 and E are given by I(A1 :E) and this amount
of bits has to be substracted at the privacy amplification
stage of the process.
Consequently, the rate of the protocol is
min
j=2,...,N
I(A1 :Aj)(̺
(cqq)
A1AjE
)− I(A1 :E)(̺(cqq)A1AjE) (66)
and therefore, the multipartite distillable key satisfies
CD(̺AE) ≥ min
j=2,...,N
I(A1 :Aj)(̺
(cqq)
A1AjE
)−I(A1 :E)(̺(cqq)A1AjE).
(67)
Here, ̺
(cqq)
A1AjE
denotes the cqq state, which arises from
(65) by tracing out all the parties but the first and jth
one and Eve. Moreover, by I(X : Y )(̺XY ) we denoted
the mutual information defined as I(X : Y )(̺XY ) =
S(̺X) + S(̺Y )− S(̺XY ) with S denoting the von Neu-
mann entropy.
We have still some freedom in choosing the distributing
party and therefore we can always choose the one for
which the rate of the extended Devetak–Winter protocol
is highest. In this way we get the lower bound on CD of
the form
CD(̺AE) ≥ max
i=1,...,N
×
 min
j=1,...,N
j 6=i
I(Ai :Aj)(̺
(cqq)
AiAjE
)− I(Ai :E)(̺(cqq)AiAjE)
 ,
(68)
Let us finally mention that due to the Theorem IV.1
we can also bound KD from below using (68). Namely,
since KD(̺A) = CD(|ψAE〉), we have the following
KD(̺A) ≥ max
i=1,...,N
 min
j=1,...,N
j 6=i
I(Ai :Aj)− I(Ai :E)
 ,
(69)
where the respective quantities are calculated from e.g.,
the cq state following the purification of ̺A.
Now we can go back to the definition of KD. As
previously mentioned, it holds that KD(P
(+)
d,N ) = log d.
To show it explicitly, on the one hand we can utilize
the above bound. We know from Theorem IV.1 that
KD(P
(+)
d,N ) = CD(|ψ(+)AE 〉), where |ψ(+)AE 〉 is a purification
of P
(+)
d,N and obviously has the form |ψ(+)d,N 〉A|E〉 with |E〉
being some state kept by Eve. Measurement of the A
subsystem of |ψ(+)AE 〉 with respect to the standard basis
leads us to the ideal cq state ̺
(cq)
AE = ω
(d,N)
A ⊗ |E〉〈E|,
where
ω
(d,N)
A =
1
d
d−1∑
i=0
|i〉〈i|⊗N , (70)
which has the quantities I(Ai : Aj) = log d (i, j =
1, . . . , N) and I(Ai :E) = 0 (i = 1, . . . , N). Substituting
both these facts into Eq. (68) gives us KD(P
(+)
d,N ) ≥ log d.
On the other hand we can utilize the bound given in
Eq. (41). Firstly, notice that S(ρ⊗n‖σ⊗n) = nS(ρ‖σ) for
two an arbitrary natural number n and arbitrary density
matrices ρ and σ. Secondly, one easily finds that (see e.g.
Ref. [31])
S
(
P
(+)
d,N
∥∥ω(d,N)A ) = log d (71)
and consequently the following estimate holds
KD(P
(+)
d,N )= limn→∞
1
n
inf
̺sep
A
∈D
S(P
(+)⊗n
d,N ‖̺sepA )
≤ lim
n→∞
1
n
S
(
P
(+)⊗n
d,N
∥∥ω(d,N)⊗nA )
= lim
n→∞
1
n
nS
(
P
(+)
d,N
∥∥ω(d,N)A )
=log d. (72)
Thus KD(P
(+)
d,N ) ≤ log d and taking into account the pre-
viously obtained inequality KD(P
(+)
d,N ) ≤ log d we infer
KD(P
(+)
d,N ) = log d. Thus, as stated previously, the mul-
tipartite distillable key may be considered as a entangle-
ment measure.
Let us discuss the last issue of this section. To ap-
ply the extended Devetak–Winter protocol successfully,
that is to get a nonzero rate, one obviously has to have
the right–hand side of Eq. (68) positive. One knows
from Theorem IV.1 that distillation of some multipartite
private state by means of LOCC is equivalent to the dis-
tillation of an ideal cq state by means of LOPC. This
in turn means that the closer some particular state ̺AA′
is to some multipartite private state, the closer is a cq
state obtained from it to the ideal cq state. Then, from
Theorem IV.3 it follows that the closer some cq state is
to the ideal cq state the closer are its bipartite reduc-
tions to the bipartite ideal ccq state. Both these facts
mean that by distilling some multipartite private state
from copies of a given state we can make the right–hand
side of Eq. (68) (equivalently Eq. (69)) positive. Con-
sequently, concatenating some LOCC protocol distilling
multipartite private states (an example of such a proto-
col is given in the following subsection) and the extended
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Devetak–Winter protocol introduces a subtle effect here.
Namely, on the one hand, using more copies in the LOCC
protocol producing a state that is closer to some multi-
partite private state makes the right–hand side of Eq.
(68) larger. On the other hand spending more copies
decreases the success probability which needs to be in-
cluded in the overall rate of the protocol. This issue will
become more clear when some particular classes of states
will be investigated in the next section.
C. Recursive LOCC protocol distilling multipartite
private states
Here we provide an illustrative example of a recursive
LOCC protocol allowing for distillation of multipartite
private states from some classes of states. This protocol
is a generalization of the LOCC protocol discussed in
Ref. [13] to the case of an arbitrary number of parties.
Assume then that N parties A1, . . . , AN have k copies
of some state ρAA′ in their possession. In ith step each
party performs the following operations.
• Take the state ρ(i−1)AA′ (where ρ(0)AA′ = ρAA′) and one
of the remaining k − i copies of ρAA′ .
• Treating A part of ρ(i−1)
AA′
(ρAA′) as source (target)
qubits, perform CNOT operations.
• Finally, the parties perform the measurement in
computational basis on the target qubits and com-
pare the results: in the case of equal results (all
zeros or all ones) the parties keep the state, other-
wise they get rid of it.
In this way, spending k copies of some state ρAA′ , all
the parties can distill a state ̺
(k)
AA′
that is closer to some
multipartite private state than the initial one, i.e., ρAA′ .
Quantitative analysis concerning this protocol after ap-
plication to two different constructions of states may be
found in Sections VA and VB.
D. Multipartite privacy squeezing
Concluding the discussion concerning the distillable
key we need to mention the multipartite version of the
so–called privacy squeezing [12, 13] together with its ap-
plication in the recent important method [16] of bound-
ing the secret key from below. Following Lemma III.1
we know that having some state ̺AA′ expressed in the
form (18), there always exists a twisting Ut that the state˜̺A = TrA′(Ut̺AA′U †t ) has some special form. Namely, in
some chosen row (column) some of its entries are trace
norms of respective blocks of ̺AA′ . We will call the state˜̺A obtained in this way privacy squeezed state. Further-
more, we already know that twistings do not change the
cq state with respect to some basis BprodN .
Let us now proceed by stating some of the conclusion
following both the above facts. As previously mentioned
we have that KD(̺A) = CD(|ψAE〉), where |ψAE〉 de-
notes the purification of ̺A. Assuming that all the par-
ties share some state ̺AA′ defined onH⊗H′ and denoting
by |ψAA′E〉 the purification of ̺AA′ , we have
KD(̺AA′) = CD(|ψAA′E〉) ≥ CD(̺AE) ≥ CD(̺(cq)AE ).
(73)
Here ̺AE = TrA′ |ψAA′E〉〈ψAA′E | and ̺(cq)AE stands for a cq
state obtained upon the measurement of the A subsystem
in BprodN . The first inequality follows from the fact that
throwing out the A′ subsystem one can only lower the key
as it could be treated ’virtually’ as giving it to Eve. The
second inequality is a consequence of the fact that mea-
surement in some product basis leads to classical state
on the A part of the state (notice that such measurement
is LOPC operation which due to the definition of CD can
only lower its value).
Now we can formulate and prove the following theorem
as a multipartite generalization of the bipartite consid-
erations from Ref. [16] (cf. [14]) which exploit privacy
squeezing to bound the secure key from below.
Theorem IV.4. Let ̺AA′ be some N–partite state de-
fined on H⊗H′. Then
KD(̺AA′) ≥ CD(˜̺(cq)AE ), (74)
where ˜̺(cq)AE is a cq state derived from purification |˜̺AE〉
of privacy squeezed state ˜̺A = TrA′(Ut̺AA′U †t ).
Proof. Denoting by |ψAA′E〉 the purification of ̺AA′ ,
we have immediately from Eq. (73) that KD(̺AA′) ≥
CD(̺
(cq)
AE ) with ̺
(cq)
AE standing for a cq state being a re-
sult of the measurement of A part in BprodN and tracing A′
part of |ψAA′E〉. Then, as already stated, for any twisting
Ut (in BprodN ) the states ̺AA′ and ˜̺AA′ ≡ Ut̺AA′U †t have
the same cq states with respect to the basis BprodN . Con-
sequently, CD(̺
(cq)
AE ) = CD(σ
(cq)
AE ) with σ
(cq)
AE being a cq
state derived from the twisted state Ut̺AA′U
†
t (obviously
via its purification). Now, we can consider the situation
in which the A′ subsystem is given to Eve. This means
that instead of taking ’huge’ purification |ψ˜AA′E〉 of the
privacy squeezed state ˜̺A = TrA′ ˜̺AA′ = TrA′(Ut̺AA′U †t )
we can take a ’smaller’ version denoted by |˜̺AE〉 (more
precisely to purify some density matrix acting on H it
suffices to use a Hilbert space of lower dimensionality
than to purify a state acting on H ⊗H′). The new pu-
rification obviously must obey ˜̺A = TrE |˜̺AE〉〈˜̺AE |. Now
comparing these two situations we infer that CD(σ
(cq)
AE ) ≥
CD(˜̺(cq)AE ) holds, where ˜̺(cq)AE is cq state appearing upon
measurement of A subsystem of |˜̺AE〉 in BprodN . The in-
equality is a consequence of the fact that in the case of
the first cq state the A′ part unused, however, kept by the
parties. In turn, in the second situation the A′ subsystem
is treated as it would be given to Eve when deriving ˜̺(cq)AE .
Giving some part of state can only lower the secrecy as in
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this case, roughly speaking, she gains some information
about what is shared by the parties. This concludes the
proof.
V. CONSTRUCTIONS
In this section we present two constructions of multi-
partite bound entangled states with nonzero distillable
cryptographic key. Both are based on the structure ex-
hibited by the GHZ states and therefore the scheme of
secure key distillation presented above easily applies here.
The first construction is a straightforward generaliza-
tion of the bipartite construction presented in Ref. [15].
Therefore, for comparative purposes, we present also a
plot containing a lower bound on distillable key in the
bipartite case. The second construction is completely
new and in comparison to the first one allows to get a
higher lower bounds on distillable key than the first one.
Before we start it is desirable to establish the notation
that we will use extensively below. By P(N)0 we shall de-
note a projector onto the N–partite pure state |ψ(N)0 〉 =
|0〉⊗N and P(N)i (i = 1, . . . , N) is a projector onto the
N–partite state |ψ(N)i 〉, in which the ith party possesses|1〉, while other particles are in the |0〉 state. For in-
stance P(4)2 denotes the projector onto the four–partite
pure state |ψ(4)2 〉 = |0100〉. Moreover, let P
(N)
0 and P
(N)
i
denote projectors obtained from P(N)0 and P(N)i , respec-
tively, by exchanging all zeros and ones. Thus, for ex-
ample P(4)2 is the projector onto |ψ
(4)
2 〉 = |1011〉. We
will denote in an analogous way by |ψ(N)ij 〉 (|ψ
(N)
ij 〉) a N–
qubit pure state, in which ith and jth qubits are in the
|1〉 (|0〉) state and the remaining ones are in the |0〉 (|1〉)
state. Then by P(N)ij and P
(N)
ij we denote projectors onto
|ψ(N)ij 〉 and |ψ
(N)
ij 〉, respectively.
Let also Ti denote the partial transposition with re-
spect to ith party (with the exception that T0 denotes the
identity map). Here we usually assume that each party
has two subsystems of a given state ̺AA′ and sometimes
Ti will be denoting the partial transposition with respect
to one or both subsystems. It will be, however, clear
from the context which of the subsystems are partially
transposed. Concatenation of partial transpositions with
respect to some subset of parties, say A1, . . . , Ak will be
denoted by T1,...,k.
A. The first construction
Here we assume that the key part on each site is
of qubit structure, while the shield part has arbitrary
dimension, however, with the same dimension on each
site. More precisely, we have Hi = C2 and H′i = CD
(i = 1, . . . , N).
Now, let us introduce the following matrix
X
(N)
D =
1
DN + 2D − 4
[
(D − 2)P (+)D,N − 2P (N)D +Q(N)D
]
,
(75)
where, as previously, P
(+)
D,N denotes a projector onto the
N–partite D–dimensional GHZ state (see Eq. (10)), and
P
(N)
D and Q
(N)
D are projectors defined as
P
(N)
D = R
(N)
D − P (+)D,N , Q(N)D = 1DN −R(N)D , (76)
where
R
(N)
D =
D−1∑
i=0
|i〉〈i|⊗N . (77)
The projectors P
(N)
D and Q
(N)
D are chosen in such a way
that each operator from the triple P
(+)
D,N , P
(N)
D , and Q
(N)
D
is defined on orthogonal support. Furthermore, the de-
nominator in Eq. (75) is chosen such that the matrix
X
(N)
D is normalized in the trace norm.
The states under consideration are of the form
̺
(D,N)
AA′ =
1
N (N)D
[
N∑
i=0
(
P(N)i + P
(N)
i
)
A
⊗
(∣∣∣X(N)TiD ∣∣∣Ti)
A′
+
(|0〉〈1|⊗N + |1〉〈0|⊗N)
A
⊗
(
X
(N)
D
)
A′
]
, (78)
where the subscripts A and A′ are indicated to distinguish
their key and shield parts, respectively. However, for the
sake of clarity, in further considerations these subscripts
will be omitted.
The normalization factor N (N)D appearing in Eq. (78)
is given by
N (N)D = 2
(N + 1)DN + 2D − 4
DN + 2D − 4 . (79)
At the beginning we need to show that the matrices
̺
(D,N)
AA′
really represent quantum states, i.e., they are pos-
itive (the normalization condition is already satisfied).
Firstly, let us notice that the blocks corresponding to
P0 and P0 and the two off–diagonal blocks in Eq. (78)
constitute a matrix of the form M2
(∣∣X(N)D ∣∣, X(N)D ) (see
Lemma A.1 for the definition ofMN ), positivity of which
is guaranteed by Lemma A.1. Thus the only thing we
need to deal with is to show that the remaining blocks
lying on the diagonal of ̺
(D,N)
AA′
are positive. To achieve
this goal, below we prove a more general lemma.
Lemma V.1. Let X
(N)
D be defined by Eq. (75). Then
the matrices
∣∣X(N)TkD ∣∣Tl are positive semi–definite for all
k, l = 1, . . . , N .
Proof. Noticing that R
(N)
D is diagonal for arbitrary
D and N , the partial transposition of X
(N)
D with re-
spect to the k–th subsystem may be written as X
(N)Tk
D =
14
[1/(DN+2D−4)](S(N)TkD −R(N)D ), where S(N)D is defined
as
S
(N)
D = 1DN +DP
(+)
D,N − 2R(N)D . (80)
As we will see below S
(N)Tk
D is positive for any k =
1, . . . , N and S
(N)Tk
D R
(N)
D = 0. Consequently, the abso-
lute value of X
(N)Tk
D may be obtained by simple changing
the sign before the projector R
(N)
D . To prove positivity
of S
(N)Tk
D let |ψ〉 =
∑D−1
i1,...,iN
αi1...iN |i1 . . . iN〉 denote an
arbitrary vector from (CD)⊗N written in the standard
basis of (CD)⊗N . Then we have〈
ψ
∣∣S(N)TkD ∣∣ψ〉=∑
i6=j
α∗i...j...iαj...i...j +
∑
(i1,...,iN )∈I
|αi1...iN |2
=
∑
(i1,...,iN )∈Ik
|αi1...iN |2 +
1
2
∑
i6=j
|αi...j...i + αj...i...j |2
≥ 0. (81)
Here the notation αi...j...i means that all indices of αs ex-
cluding the k–th one (k stands for the number of subsys-
tem being partially transposed) are equal. Moreover, as
previously I denotes the set of all sequences (i1, . . . , iN)
except the cases when i1 = . . . = iN , while Ik is the set
I minus all sequences in which all indices but the one on
k–th position are equal.
As the value of k is not specified, the above considera-
tions holds for any k = 1, . . . , N . Furthermore, using the
same reasoning one can also prove positiveness of S
(N)
D
being transposed with respect to any subset of different
subsystems (besides the full transposition). This fact will
be utilized below.
By virtue of the positiveness of S
(N)Tk
D we have that∣∣X(N)TkD ∣∣ = [1/(DN + 2D − 4)](S(N)TkD + R(N)D ) for any
k = 1, . . . , N . Therefore the partial transposition of the
latter with respect to the l–th subsystem gives∣∣∣X(N)TkD ∣∣∣Tl = 1DN + 2D − 4 (S(N)Tk,lD +R(N)D ) , (82)
where Tk,l denotes the partial transposition with respect
to two single subsystems A′k and A
′
l. Now we can dis-
tinguish two cases, namely, if k = l and k 6= l. In the
first one, double partial transpositions with respect to the
same subsystem is just an identity map. Consequently
from Eqs. (76), (77), and (80), one has
∣∣∣X(N)TkD ∣∣∣Tk = 1DN + 2D − 4 (Q(N)D +DP (+)D,N) , (83)
Now the right–hand side of Eq. (83) is a linear com-
bination of two positive operators and thus is positive.
We have still left the second case, that is, when k 6= l.
To resolve it we may use the remark made above, say-
ing that the partial transposition of S
(N)
D with respect
to arbitrary non only one–partite subsystem is a positive
matrix. This ends the proof.
Thus we have just proven that ̺
(D,N)
AA′
indeed represent
quantum states. Now, our aim is to prove that on the
one hand they are bound entangled and on the other
hand they have nonzero distillable key. This purpose will
be achieved in two steps. Firstly we show that partial
transposition with respect to any elementary subsystem
(AiA
′
i) of ̺
(D,N)
AA′
is positive. Obviously, this does not
confirm that the states are bound entangled since we do
not even know they are entangled. However, the latter
may be proven by showing that KD of these states is
nonzero for D ≥ 3.
Firstly, we concentrate on the positivity of all partial
transpositions of ̺
(D,N)
AA′ . To gain a better look on the
problem let us consider a particular example of such a
partial transposition, namely, ̺
(D,3)T3
AA′ . From Eq. (78) it
follows that
̺
(D,3)T3
AA′ =
1
N (3)D

∣∣∣X(3)D ∣∣∣T3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0
∣∣∣X(3)T3D ∣∣∣ 0 0 0 0 X(3)T3D 0
0 0
∣∣∣X(3)T2D ∣∣∣T2,3 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0
∣∣∣X(3)T1D ∣∣∣T1,3 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣X(3)T1D ∣∣∣T1,3 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
∣∣∣X(3)T2D ∣∣∣T2,3 0 0
0 X
(3)T3
D 0 0 0 0
∣∣∣X(3)T3D ∣∣∣ 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
∣∣∣X(3)D ∣∣∣T3

. (84)
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As, due to Lemma A.1, the square matrix consisting
of two diagonal and two off–diagonal blocks of ̺
(D,N)Ti
AA′
(cf. Eq. (84)) i.e., the matrix M2(
∣∣X(N)TiD ∣∣, X(N)TiD ), is
already positive, what we need to prove is positivity of∣∣X(N)D ∣∣Ti and ∣∣X(N)TiD ∣∣Tj,k for any i, j, k = 1, . . . , N . Let
us therefore prove the following lemma.
Lemma V.2. Let X
(N)
D be given by Eq. (75). Then for
any i, j, k = 1, . . . , N it holds that∣∣∣X(N)D ∣∣∣Ti ≥ 0, ∣∣∣X(N)TiD ∣∣∣Tj,k ≥ 0. (85)
Proof. Due to the definition of X
(N)
D its absolute value
may be calculated simply by changing a sign before P
(N)
D ,
giving∣∣∣X(N)D ∣∣∣ = 1DN + 2D − 4 [(D − 2)P (+)D,N + 2P (N)D +Q(N)D ] .
(86)
Application of partial transposition with respect to the
ith subsystem followed by substitution of Eq. (76) leads
us to∣∣∣X(N)D ∣∣∣Ti = 1DN + 2D − 4 [1D +R(N)D + (D − 4)P (+)TiD,N ]
(87)
for any i = 1, . . . , N . One may easily check that eigen-
values of P
(+)Ti
D,N belong to the interval [−1/D, 1/D] and
therefore the matrix 1DN +(D−4)P (+)TiD,N is always posi-
tive. This, together with the fact that R
(N)
D ≥ 0, implies
positivity of
∣∣X(N)D ∣∣Ti for any i = 1, . . . , N .
The second fact of the lemma may be proven just by
noting that by virtue of Eq. (82) it holds∣∣∣X(N)TiD ∣∣∣Tj,k = 1DN + 2D − 4 (S(N)Ti,j,kD +R(N)D ) .
(88)
As stated previously in the proof of Lemma V.1, the par-
tial transposition of S
(N)
D with respect to arbitrary sub-
systems is positive. This concludes the proof.
The above lemma proves actually that all the par-
tial transpositions ̺
(D,N)Ti
AA′
(i = 1, . . . , N) are positive.
Therefore, the states ̺
(D,N)
AA′
are bound entangled, of
course provided that they are entangled. This is because,
due to the result of Ref. [11], positive partial transpo-
sitions with respect to any elementary subsystem makes
it impossible to distill k–partite (k = 2, . . . , N) GHZ en-
tanglement among any group of parties.
Let us now pass to the proof that any state ̺
(D,N)
AA′
for
D ≥ 3 has nonzero KD. For this purpose we show that
using the protocol from Section IVC we can produce a
state that is closer to some multipartite private state out
of copies of ̺
(D,N)
AA′
. As we will show below we need to use
as many copies as it is necessary to make the quantity
appearing on the right–hand side of Eq. (69) strictly
positive.
Application of the recursive LOCC protocol presented
in Section IVC to k copies of ̺
(D,N)
AA′
gives with probabil-
ity p
(k)
D,N = 2
k−1N (k)D,N/
(N (N)D )k the following state
Θ
(N,k)
AA′ =
1
N (k)D,N
[
N∑
i=0
(
P(N)i + P
(N)
i
)
⊗
(∣∣∣X(N)TiD ∣∣∣Ti)⊗k
+
(|0〉〈1|⊗N + |1〉〈0|⊗N)⊗ (X(N)D )⊗k] , (89)
where N (k)D,N is a normalization factor given by
N (k)D,N = 2
[
1 +N
(
DN
DN + 2D − 4
)k]
. (90)
Now, to simplify the considerations we can utilize the pri-
vacy squeezing (see Section IVD) to the obtained states
Θ
(N,k)
AA′ . Namely, due to Lemma III.1 there exist such
twistings U
(k)
t that after application to Θ
(N,k)
AA′ and trac-
ing out the A′ subsystem one arrives at the following class
of N–qubit states
Θ˜
(N,k)
A =
1
N (k)D,N
[
N∑
i=0
(
P(N)i + P
(N)
i
)∥∥∥∥∣∣∣X(N)TiD ∣∣∣Ti∥∥∥∥k
1
+
(|0〉〈1|⊗N + |1〉〈0|⊗N) ∥∥∥X(N)D ∥∥∥k
1
]
. (91)
In other words, after ’rotation’ with U
(k)
t and throwing
out the A′ subsystem we get a so–called privacy squeezed
state, i.e., the one in which blocks are replaced with their
norms. We also know from Theorem IV.4 that the dis-
tillable key of the cq state obtained from the privacy
squeezed state Θ˜
(N,k)
A (measurement is performed in the
same basis as twisting) cannot be greater than the dis-
tillable key of Θ
(N,k)
AA′ .
From Eq. (90) it follows that since DN +2D−4 > DN
for any D ≥ 3 one has N (k)D,N → 2, while for D = 2,
N (k)2,N → 2(N + 1). In turn this means that for the off–
diagonal elements of Θ˜
(N,k)
A one has that
1
N (k)D,N
∥∥∥X(N)D ∥∥∥k
1
=
1
N (k)D,N
k→∞−−−→ 1
2
(92)
with D ≥ 3. By virtue of Theorem III.3 one infers that
the more copies of ̺
(D,N)
AA′ we put into the recurrence pro-
tocol, the closer we are to some multipartite private state.
This also means that with k →∞ the sequence of states
Θ˜
(N,k)
A goes to GHZ state P
(+)
2,N , however, for D ≥ 3.
Now, to bound from below the distillable key of Θ
(N,k)
AA′
according to the prescription given above we need to cal-
culate a cq state of the privacy squeezed state Θ˜
(N,k)
A .
(The cq state is found here with respect to the basis in
16
which the original state is defined.) Simple algebra gives
Θ˜
(cq)
AE =
1
N (k)D,N
[
R
(N)
2 ⊗ |E0〉〈E0|+
(
DN
DN + 2D − 4
)k
×
N∑
j=1
(
P
(N)
j ⊗ |Ej〉〈Ej |+ P
(N)
j ⊗ |Ej〉〈Ej|
) ,
(93)
where |E0〉, |Ej〉, and |Ej〉 constitute a set of orthonormal
states held by Eve. One notices immediately that Θ˜
(cq)
AE
tends to the multipartite ideal cq state (see Eq. (2)) for
any integer D ≥ 3 whenever k →∞.
To find a lower bound on distillable key of Θ˜
(N,k)
A we
utilize Eq. (68). However, according to Eq. (68) one
needs to calculate the quantities I(Ai :Aj) for i 6= j and
I(Ai : E) for the respective reductions of Θ
(cq)
AE . Fortu-
nately, the initial states ̺
(D,N)
AA′
have such symmetrical
structure, preserved by the recurrence protocol and the
privacy squeezing, that makes all the quantities I(Ai :Aj)
(i 6= j) equal (the same holds for I(Ai : E)). Conse-
quently, in view of the above, using Eq. (68) and Theo-
rem IV.4 (see Eq. (74)), we infer the following inequality
KD(Θ
(N,k)
AA′
) ≥ I(A1 :A2)(Θ(ccq)A1A2E)− I(A1 :E)(Θ
(ccq)
A1A2E
).
(94)
irrespectively of number of parties N . Exemplary be-
haviour of the right–hand side of Eq. (94) (denoted by
KDW ) in the function of k and D for N = 3 is shown in
Fig. 1a. It is clear from Figure 1a that it is possible to
distill one secure bit of key from bound entangled states
Θ
(N,k)
AA′
for sufficiently large k. For comparison, Fig. 1b
contains a lower bound of the distillable key in the case
of N = 2 discussed in Ref. [15].
We can also investigate the lower bound on KD for
the initial states ̺
(D,N)
AA′
. However, in this case we need
to take into account the probability p
(k)
D,N . In this way
we arrive at
KD(̺
(D,N)
AA′
)≥ p(k)D,N
[
I(A1 :A2)(Θ
(ccq)
A1A2E
)
−I(A1 :E)(Θ(ccq)A1A2E)
]
. (95)
Figure 2a presents exemplary behaviour of the function
appearing on the right–hand side of Eq. (95) (denoted
by K˜DW ) for N = 3. For comparison, in Figure 2b it is
also plotted the same function in the case of N = 2 (this
case was discussed in Ref. [27]).
Let us conclude the first construction with discussion
of some of its general properties. Above we used a
particular class of matrices X
(N)
D (defined in Eq. (75)),
however, it seems interesting to ask wether there are
other matrices than X
(N)
D that could be used in the con-
struction. In what follows we provide some constraints
that the general matrix, hereafter denoted by Z
(N)
D ,
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FIG. 1: An exemplary plot of KDW ≡ I(A1 :A2)(Θ
(ccq)
A1A2E
)−
I(A1 :E)(Θ
(ccq)
A1A2E
) with N = 3 (a) and for comparison in the
case of N = 2 (b), which was discussed in Ref. [27]. For the
sake of clarity, zero is put whenever the plotted function is less
than zero. Notice also that even though k and D are discrete
parameters, the graph is made as if KDW were a function of
continuous parameters. It follows from both the figures that
the number of parties N significantly influences the obtained
lower bound. Namely, for N = 3 one needs to spend more
copies of a given state to get nonzero values of KDW .
must obey to be useful for purposes of the construction.
The first important condition is that the trace norm
of Z
(N)
D has to be strictly larger than the trace norm
of
∣∣Z(N)TiD ∣∣Ti for all i = 1, ..., N . This guarantees
convergence (in the trace norm) of the output states
of the recursive LOCC protocol (given in Sec. IV.C)
to some multipartite private states. Another crucial
conditions are
∣∣Z(N)TiD ∣∣Ti ≥ 0 and ∣∣Z(N)D ∣∣Ti ≥ 0 for all
i = 1, . . . , N . The first one is necessary for ̺
(D,N)
AA′
(when
constructed with the matrix Z
(N)
D ) to be positive, while
the second one allows to prove that ̺
(D,N)
AA′
have positive
partial transposition with respect to any elementary
subsystem.
Lemma V.3. Assume that Z
(N)
D is arbitrary matrix
acting on (CD)⊗N and that the following conditions
(i)
∥∥∥Z(N)D ∥∥∥
1
>
∥∥∥∥∣∣∣Z(N)TiD ∣∣∣Ti∥∥∥∥
1
for all i = 1, . . . , N ,
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FIG. 2: An exemplary plot of eKDW ≡
p
(k)
D,3
h
I(A1 :A2)(Θ
(ccq)
A1A2E
)− I(A1 :E)(Θ
(ccq)
A1A2E
)
i
with N = 3.
For comparison it is also presented the case of N = 2 (b). For
the sake of clarity, zero is put whenever the plotted function
is less or equal to zero. Also, though both the parameters
k and D are integer, for convenience, the function eKDW is
plotted as if it were a function of continuous k and D. It is
clear that for N = 3 the lower bound on distillable key is
considerably smaller.
(ii)
∣∣∣Z(N)TiD ∣∣∣Ti ≥ 0 for all i = 1, . . . , N ,
(iii)
∣∣∣Z(N)D ∣∣∣Ti ≥ 0 for all i = 1, . . . , N
are satisfied. Then Z
(N)
D  0 and Z
(N)Ti
D  0 for all
i = 1, . . . , N .
Proof. (ad absurdum) We divide the proof into three
parts:
(i) Assume that Z
(N)
D ≥ 0 and Z(N)TiD  0 for any
i = 1, . . . , N . Then one can see that
∣∣Z(N)D ∣∣Ti =
Z
(N)Ti
D  0 for any choice of i. However, this con-
tradicts the third assumption.
(ii) Assume that Z
(N)
D  0 and there exists such k
that Z
(N)Tk
D ≥ 0. Now, one obtains
∣∣Z(N)TkD ∣∣Tk =
Z
(N)
D  0. Of course, this is in contradiction to the
second assumption.
(iii) Finally, assume that Z
(N)
D ≥ 0 and that there exists
such k that Z
(N)Tk
D ≥ 0. Then
∥∥∥∣∣Z(N)TkD ∣∣Tk∥∥∥
1
=∥∥∥Z(N)D ∥∥∥
1
. This contradicts the first assumption.
This lemma says that a matrix can be used in the above
construction if it is not positive and all its elementary
partial transpositions are not positive. Thus, in particu-
lar, a general density matrix is not suitable for this con-
struction.
B. The second construction
The crucial ideas behind the second construction are
actually the same as in the case of the first one, however,
considerations will be a little bit more sophisticated.
Let us first define the analog of X
(N)
D from the first
construction to be
X˜
(N)
D =
D−1∑
i,j=0
uij |i〉〈j|⊗N , (96)
where we assume that uij are elements of some D × D
general unitary or unitary Hermitian matrix, hereafter
denoted by UD. Thus X˜
(N)
D is an embedding of UD ∈
MD(C) (MD(C) denotes the set of D×D matrices with
complex entries) in MDN (C) and therefore∣∣∣X˜(N)D ∣∣∣ = R(N)D . (97)
For further simplicity we also impose the condition that
|uij | = 1/
√
D for i, j = 0, . . . , D − 1, however whenever
possible all proofs will be given assuming that UD is a
general unitary matrix.
It should be also pointed out that the distinction on
unitary or unitary and Hermitian matrices UD made
above plays an important role here. This comes from
the LOCC protocol presented in Section IVC as in the
case of unitary but not Hermitian matrices it needs to be
slightly modified. Namely, in its last step all the parties
keep the state only if all zeros occurred.
A particular example of a unitary but in general not
Hermitian matrix satisfying the above condition is the
matrix V˜D = (1/
√
D)VD, where VD denotes the Vander-
monde matrix of solutions to the equation zD − 1 = 0
with z ∈ C. As one knows the solutions are of the form
ωk = e
2πik/D (k = 0, . . . , D − 1). It is then clear that
V˜D is a unitary matrix for any D ≥ 2, however not al-
ways a Hermitian one. For instance, in the particular
case of D = 2 one easily recognizes that V˜2 is the known
Hadamard matrix. A good example of some unitary and
Hermitian matrix is kth tensor power of V˜2. Since V˜2
is unitary and Hermitian any matrix of the form V˜ ⊗k2 is
also unitary and Hermitian.
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Now, let us consider following family of matrices
˜̺(D,N)AA′ = 1N˜ (N)D
 N∑
j=0
(
P(N)j + P
(N)
j
)
⊗
N∑
i=1
∣∣∣X˜(N)TjD,i ∣∣∣
+|0〉〈1|⊗N ⊗
N∑
i=1
X˜
(N)
D,i + |1〉〈0|⊗N ⊗
N∑
i=1
X˜
(N)†
D,i
]
,
(98)
where N˜ (N)D stands for the normalization factor, which
for arbitrary unitary UD is given by
N˜ (N)D = 2N
D +N D−1∑
i,j=0
|uij |
 . (99)
Obviously for X˜
(N)
D that comes from unitary Hermitian
UD the conjugation in the last term in Eq. (98) may be
omitted. Moreover, taking into account the assumption
that |uij | = 1/
√
D, the normalization factor becomes
N˜ (N)D = 2ND(1 +N
√
D).
As in the case of the first construction, we need to
prove that ˜̺(D,N)AA′ represent quantum states. Moreover,
we show also that they have positive partial transposi-
tions with respect to any elementary subsystem. From
Eq. (98) it follows that to prove positivity of ˜̺(D,N)
AA′
one
has to show that the inequalities∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
i=1
X˜
(N)
D,i
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
N∑
i=1
∣∣∣X˜(N)D,i ∣∣∣ (100)
are satisfied. Then simply utilizing Lemma A.1 and not-
ing that the remaining blocks lying on the diagonal of˜̺(D,N)
AA′
are positive by definition, the positivity of ˜̺(D,N)
AA′
is proved.
To deal with the problem of positivity of partial trans-
positions let us look on the particular example of form of˜̺(D,3)T3AA′ . From Eq. (98) one infers that
˜̺(D,3)T3AA′ = 1N˜ (3)D

3∑
i=1
∣∣∣X˜(3)D,i∣∣∣ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0
3∑
i=1
∣∣∣X˜(3)T3D,i ∣∣∣ 0 0 0 0 3∑
i=1
X˜
(3)T3
D,i 0
0 0
3∑
i=1
∣∣∣X˜(3)T2D,i ∣∣∣ 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0
3∑
i=1
∣∣∣X˜(3)T1D,i ∣∣∣ 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
3∑
i=1
∣∣∣X˜(3)T1D,i ∣∣∣ 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
3∑
i=1
∣∣∣X˜(3)T2D,i ∣∣∣ 0 0
0
3∑
i=1
X˜
(3)T3†
D,i 0 0 0 0
3∑
i=1
∣∣∣X˜(3)T3D,i ∣∣∣ 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3∑
i=1
∣∣∣X˜(3)D,i∣∣∣

, (101)
where we used the fact that
∣∣X˜(n)TjD,i ∣∣ are diagonal in the
standard basis and therefore are not affected by partial
transposition with respect to any subsystems.
To show positivity of ˜̺(D,N)
AA′
as well as its partial trans-
positions we prove the following lemma.
Lemma V.4. Let X˜
(N)
D be defined as in Eq. (96). Then
the following equalities holds
∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
i=1
X˜
(N)Tj
D,i
∣∣∣∣∣ =
N∑
i=1
∣∣∣X˜(N)TjD,i ∣∣∣ (j = 0, . . . , N). (102)
Proof. Firstly we start by the above statement for j = 0.
For this purpose let us notice that its left–hand side may
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be written as
∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
i=1
X˜
(N)
D,i
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣N
D−1∑
k=0
ukk|k〉〈k|⊗N +
N∑
i=1
D−1∑
k,l=0
k 6=l
ukl(|k〉〈l|⊗N )Ti
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
(103)
Straightforward algebra shows that both terms under the
sign of absolute value are defined on orthogonal sup-
ports. Moreover, all the partial transpositions in the
second term are defined on orthogonal supports. Both
these facts allow us to write∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
i=1
X˜
(N)
D,i
∣∣∣∣∣ = N
D−1∑
k,l=0
|ukl| |l〉〈l|⊗(i−1)⊗|k〉〈k|⊗|l〉〈l|⊗(N−i−1).
(104)
One finds immediately that this equals the right–hand
side of (102), finishing the first part of the proof.
To show Eq. (102) for j = 1, . . . , N we need to perform
a little bit more sophisticated analysis. With the same
reasoning as in the case of the first inequality we can
reduce the claimed inequalities to the following∣∣∣∣∣X˜(N)D + (N − 1)
D−1∑
k=0
ukk|k〉〈k|⊗N
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ R(N)D
+(N − 1)
D−1∑
k=0
|ukk||k〉〈k|⊗N , (105)
where we utilized Eq. (97). One notices that the above
inequality may be further reduced to
|UD + (N − 1)D| ≤ 1D + (N − 1) |D| , (106)
where D denotes a diagonal matrix containing the diago-
nal elements of UD. Utilizing the fact that |uij | = 1/
√
D
for any i, j = 0, . . . , D−1, we infer that |D| = (1/√D)1D
and therefore
|U + (N − 1)D| ≤ [1 + (N − 1)/
√
D]1D. (107)
To prove this inequality we can utilize the polar decom-
position to its left–hand side. More precisely we can write
|U + (N − 1)D| = V †U + (N − 1)V †D with V denoting
some unitary matrix. This allows us to write
〈Ψ| |U + (N − 1)D| |Ψ〉= ∣∣〈Ψ| |U + (N − 1)D| |Ψ〉∣∣
≤ ∣∣〈Ψ|V †U |Ψ〉∣∣
+(N − 1) ∣∣〈Ψ|V †D|Ψ〉∣∣
≤ 1 + (N − 1) ∣∣〈Ψ|V †|D|W |Ψ〉∣∣
≤ 1 + N − 1√
D
, (108)
where |Ψ〉 is an arbitrary normalized vector from CD.
The second and third inequality are consequences of the
fact that the product of unitary matrices is a unitary
matrix and that for any normalized |ψ〉 and unitary U
it holds that |〈ψ|U |ψ〉| ≤ 1. Moreover, we put here the
polar decomposition of D, i.e., D = |D|W with some uni-
taryW . The last inequality is also a result of application
of aforementioned fact that |D| = (1/√D)1D.
Now, to finish the proof, it suffices to mention that the
resulting inequality is equivalent to (107).
From the above lemma it clearly follows that ˜̺(D,N)
AA′
represent quantum states for any D ≥ 2 and N ≥ 2, and
they have positive partial transpositions with respect to
all elementary subsystems. The last thing we need to
prove is that the distillable key of ˜̺(D,N)
AA′
is nonzero. This
would also imply that ˜̺(D,N)
AA′
represent entangled states.
Let us then apply the recursive protocol described pre-
viously in Section IVC to k copies of ˜̺(D,N)
AA′
, obtaining
Θ˜
(N,k)
AA′ =
1
N˜ (k)D,N
 N∑
j=0
(
P(N)j + P
(N)
j
)
⊗
(
N∑
i=1
∣∣∣X˜(N)TjD,i ∣∣∣
)⊗k
+|0〉〈1|⊗N ⊗
(
N∑
i=1
X˜
(N)
D,i
)⊗k
+|1〉〈0|⊗N ⊗
(
N∑
i=1
X˜
(N)†
D,i
)⊗k , (109)
with the normalization factor given by
N˜ (k)D,N = 2
(
ND
√
D
)k
+ 2NDk
[
1 + (N − 1)
√
D
]k
.
(110)
Notice that as previously mentioned, the LOCC proto-
col should be modified in case when X˜
(N)
D follows from
in general unitary UD. Due to the modification of the
LOCC protocol, the probability of obtaining Θ˜
(N,k)
AA′ in
the case of unitary and unitary Hermitian UD is differ-
ent. Namely, in the case of unitary Hermitian matrices
amounts to
p˜
(k,1)
D,N = 2
k−1N˜ (k)D,N/
(N˜ (1)D,N)k, (111)
while in the case of unitary non Hermitian the probability
of success is considerably smaller and is given by
p˜
(k,2)
D,N = N˜ (N)D /
(N˜ (N)D )k. (112)
Now the multipartite privacy squeezing (see Section
IVD) allows us to change blocks in Eq. (109) with their
norms, obtaining
θ˜
(N,k)
A =
1
N˜ (k)D,N
 N∑
j=0
(
P(N)j + P
(N)
j
) ∥∥∥∥∥
N∑
i=1
∣∣∣X˜(N)TjD,i ∣∣∣
∥∥∥∥∥
k
1
+
(|0〉〈1|⊗N + |1〉〈0|⊗N) ∥∥∥∥∥
N∑
i=1
X˜
(N)
D,i
∥∥∥∥∥
k
1
 . (113)
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Calculating the respective norms in the above, one may
rewrite Eq. (113) as
θ˜
(N,k)
A =
Dk
N˜ (k)D,N
[
2(N
√
D)kP
(+)
2,N
+[1 + (N − 1)
√
D]k
N∑
j=1
(
P(N)j + P
(N)
j
) .
(114)
From Eqs. (110) and (114) one easily infers that θ˜
(N,k)
A →
P
(+)
2,N for k→∞ for any D ≥ 2, which by virtue of Theo-
rem III.3 means that the recursive protocol when applied
to copies of ˜̺(D,N)
AA′
produces a state that is arbitrarily
close to some multipartite pdit in the limit of k → ∞.
In fact, as the probabilities of success p˜
(k,1)
D,N and p˜
(k,2)
D,N
(see Eqs. (111) and (112)) are positive, according to the
definition of KD (see Definition IV.1) the above method
leads to distillation of secure key from ˜̺(D,N)
AA′
. Below we
provide also plots of lower bounds on KD of ˜̺(D,N)AA′ .
For this purpose we can find the purification of ˜̺(D,N)
AA′
and then the cq state in the standard basis. The latter
has the form
Θ˜
(cq)
AE = a
(k)
D,NR
(N)
2 ⊗ |E0〉〈E0|+ b(k)D,N
×
N∑
j=1
(
P(N)j ⊗ |Ej〉〈Ej |+ P
(N)
j ⊗ |Ej〉〈Ej |
)
,(115)
where |E0〉, |Ej〉, and |Ej〉 (j = 1, . . . , N) are orthonor-
mal states kept by Eve, and coefficients a
(k)
D,N and b
(k)
D,N
are given by
a
(k)
D,N =
(ND
√
D)k
N˜ (k)D,N
(116)
and
b
(k)
D,N =
Dk
N˜ (k)D,N
[1 + (N − 1)
√
D]k. (117)
One can see from the above that the limit of k → ∞
leads us to the ideal cq state. Now we can apply the
bound given in Eq. (69). It is easy to verify that all the
quantities I(Ai :Aj) are equal here (the same holds for
I(Ai :E)) and therefore we can rewrite Eq. (69) as
KD(Θ˜
(N,k)
AA′
) ≥ I(A1 :A2)(Θ˜(ccq)A1A2E)− I(A1 : E)(Θ˜
(ccq)
A1A2E
)
(118)
Exemplary plot of the function appearing on the right–
hand side of Eq. (118) (denoted as KDW ) is presented
in Figure 3. The behavior of KDW (see Fig. 3) confirms
the previous analysis, namely, the more copies we spend
the closer the state is to some multipartite private state
we obtain using the recursive protocol. Thus the higher
key rate we can get from the obtained state Θ˜
(N,k)
AA′
.
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FIG. 3: The function appearing on the right–hand side of
Eq. (118) (denoted here by KDW ) in the function of number
of copies k and the dimension D. Zero is put whenever the
function is less than zero. Notice that both the parameters
k and D are discrete, however, continuous plot is made to
indicate better the behavior of KDW . It is clear from the plot
that for larger k the distillable key of eθ(N,k)A approaches one
bit (this is actually a maximal value obtainable from two–
qubit states) and the convergence depends on D. Namely, for
higher dimensions D the convergence to the maximal value is
faster.
We can also get a lower bound on distillable key of
the initial states ˜̺(D,N)
AA′
. Here we need to take into ac-
count the probability of success (p˜
(k,1)
D,N and p˜
(k,2)
D,N ) in the
recursive protocol.
The corresponding bounds on the distillable keys of˜̺(D,N)
AA′
are
K
(1(2))
D (˜̺(D,N)AA′ )≥ p˜(k,1(2))D,N [I(A1 :A2)(Θ˜(ccq)A1A2E)
−I(A1 :E)(Θ˜(ccq)A1A2E)
]
. (119)
Exemplary plots of the right–hand side of the above (de-
noted by K˜
(1(2))
DW ) both in the case of a unitary Hermitian
matrix (e.g. V˜ ⊗k2 ) and only a unitary matrix (e.g. V˜D)
are given in Figure 4a and 4b.
VI. REMARKS ON LIMITATIONS IN
MULTIPARTITE QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY
So far, we discussed the general scheme allowing for
distilling secure key from multipartite states. It is desir-
able however to discuss also what are the limitations of
multipartite secure key distillation.
An interesting effect, which we shall recall here, was
reported in Ref. [33], namely, it was shown that though
maximal violation of some Bell inequality it is impossible
to distill secure key from the so–called Smolin state [34]:
̺S =
1
4
3∑
i=0
|ψBi 〉〈ψBi | ⊗ |ψBi 〉〈ψBi |, (120)
where |ψBi 〉 (i = 0, . . . , 3) are the so–called Bell states
given by |ψB0(1)〉 = (1/
√
2) (|01〉 ± |10〉) and |ψB2(3)〉 =
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FIG. 4: Lower bounds on KD of e̺(D,N)AA′ in the function of k
and D. The upper plot (a) presents lower bound (denoted
here by eK(1)DW ) on KD in the case of unitary Hermitian ma-
trices UD, while in the second plot (b) lower bound ( eK(2)DW )
in the case of unitary but not Hermitian matrices is given.
Both are just a product of probability ep(k1)D,N (left) or ep(k,2)D,N
(right) and KDW plotted in Figure 3. One infers that in the
case of unitary but not Hermitian matrix UD the region of
nonzero values of the plotted function is wider than in the
case of unitary Hermitian matrices.
(1/
√
2) (|00〉 ± |11〉). This conclusion may be also in-
ferred for the generalizations of the Smolin state provided
in Ref. [35] and independently in Ref. [36] (see also Ref.
[37] for further generalizations). These are states of the
form
̺2 = |ψB0 〉〈ψB0 |,
̺S4 =
1
4
3∑
m=0
U
(m)
2 ̺2U
(m)†
2 ⊗ U (m)2 ̺2U (m)†2 ≡ ̺S ,
̺S6 =
1
4
3∑
m=0
U
(m)
4 ̺4U
(m)†
4 ⊗ U (m)2 ̺2U (m)†2 ,
...
̺S2(n+1) =
1
4
3∑
m=0
U
(m)
2n ̺2nU
(m)†
2n ⊗ U (m)2 ̺2U (m)†2
(121)
with U
(m)
k = 1
⊗(k−1)
2 ⊗ σm (m = 0, . . . , 3 and k = 2, . . .),
where σm (m = 1, 2, 3) denote the usual Pauli matrices
and σ0 = 12. The state ̺2 is just one of the Bell states,
while ̺S4 is the Smolin state. All states ̺2n for n ≥
2 are bound entangled and for suitable choice of local
observables all states for n ≥ 1 violate the Bell inequality
|E1...11 + E1...12 + E2...21 − E2...22| ≤ 2 (122)
maximally (E denotes the so–called correlation function,
i.e., an average of products of local measurement out-
comes taken over many runs of experiment). On the
other hand, due to the results of Refs. [5, 6], and Ref.
[30], one may show that it is impossible to distill multi-
partite secure key from states ̺S2n for n ≥ 2. This shows
that bipartite Ekert protocol [2] cannot be straightfor-
wardly generalized to multipartite scenario since as dis-
cussed above the maximal violation of most natural mul-
tipartite analog of the CHSH–Bell inequality [38] does
not imply nonzero secret key rate, whereas maximal vio-
lation of CHSH–Bell inequality by two qubits guarantees
secrecy. Still, it would be an interesting problem for fur-
ther research to identify all Bell inequalities that do the
job in multipartite case as CHSH–Bell inequality does in
the case of two qubits. It should be stressed that some
achievements in a similar direction were already obtained
in Refs. [39, 40], where it was shown that violation of
some Bell inequalities is sufficient condition for security
of multipartite secret sharing protocols [41] under an in-
dividual attack of some external party.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Quantum cryptography beyond entanglement distilla-
tion is a very young subject. Until recent times it was
natural to expect that the latter is impossible. While
there were significant developments concerning the bipar-
tite scenario the general formulation for multipartite case
was missing. The present paper fills this gap by not only
generalizing the scheme, but also by providing new con-
structions of multipartite bound entangled states which
is really nontrivial. However, there are many unsolved
questions. First it seems to be true that the uncondi-
tional security proof [22] can be extended here at a cost of
the number of estimated local observables, but an exact
analysis of this issue is needed. Moreover, given a fixed
number of parties, it is not known what is the minimal
dimension of elementary system of PPT like bound en-
tangled state that allows one-way secure key distillation.
Does it increase with number of particles and if so - how
the dependence looks like? Are there bound entangled
states with multipartite cryptographic key with underly-
ing structure corresponding to other classes of pure states
like graph states (see Ref. [42])? One may ask why we
have considered only bound entanglement in multipartite
scenario. This is when it is necessary to apply the gener-
alized scheme. Otherwise qualitatively (though may be
not quantitatively – see subsequent discussion) just pure
entanglement distillation is a sufficient tool. Quite natu-
ral is a question of interplay between the two approaches
in distilling key – to what extent can we abandon distil-
lation of p–dits? Finally, can the two processes always be
separated in optimal key distillation scheme: in a sense
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that one gets some number of singlet states and some
large p–dit which is bound entangled)? If it were so, the
two parts might serve as a natural measures of free and
bound entanglement in the system. Most likely this is
impossible, but one needs a proof. The closely related
question is the one concerning lockability of the secure
key KD (note that nonadditivity of KD has been proved
very recently in Ref. [43]). While this seems to be a very
hard question in case of bipartite states (though lockabil-
ity with respect to Eve has already been ruled out in Ref.
[19]) it may happen to be easier within the multipartite
paradigm presented here (in analogy to classical bound
information which is known only in asymptotic bipar-
tite form [44] but naturally emerges form bound entan-
glement in multipartite case [45]. In this context novel
upper and lower bounds on KD are needed (for recent
development see Ref. [46]). This point is also interest-
ing from the point of view of entanglement as KD is also
an entanglement measure. Further analysis of KD and
finding its multi–coordinate extensions to help in charac-
terization of multipartite entanglement seems to be rich
program for future research.
Also, though in the present paper we are concerned
with a general problem of two–way distillabillity of secure
key, it is interesting to discuss the problem in the context
of one–way schemes. For instance one could ask about
bounds on key within such schemes (see e.g. Ref. [25]).
On the other hand, it would be desirable to discuss the
present approach in the context of secure key distillation
from continuous variables systems (see e.g. Refs. [47, 48,
49]). For instance, it was shown in Ref. [50] that the
generalized version of the protocol from Ref. [47] does
not allow for secure key distillation from bound entangled
states. It seems that within the multipartite scenario the
problem could be simpler a little as one can have bound
entangled multipartite states with some of its partitions
being still NPT.
Needless to say due to Choi–Jamio lkowski isomor-
phism [51] the present analysis provides new classes of
multiparty quantum channels for which natural questions
on superactivation of the type found in bipartite case [20]
and other possible effects of similar type arise.
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APPENDIX A: SOME USEFUL LEMMAS
Lemma A.1. Assume that a given d × d matrix B is
normal. If A ≥ |B| then the matrices
MN (A,B) =

(N − 1)A B . . . B
B† (N − 1)A . . . B
...
...
. . .
...
B† B† . . . (N − 1)A

(A1)
and
M˜N (A,B) =

(N − 1)A B B . . . B
B† A 0 . . . 0
B† 0 A . . . 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
B† 0 0 . . . A
 . (A2)
are positive.
Proof. We prove the lemma only forMN(A,B) as the
proof for M˜N (A,B) goes along the same lines.
The matrix MN(A,B) consists of N2 blocks d × d
each and consequently the whole matrix has the di-
mensions Nd × Nd. Thus to prove positiveness we
need to show that for any |Ψ〉 ∈ CNd the inequality
〈Ψ|MN(A,B)|Ψ〉 ≥ 0 holds. It is clear that an arbitrary
vector |Ψ〉 ∈ CNd may be written as
|Ψ〉 =
 |x1〉...
|xN 〉
 , (A3)
where each |xi〉 belongs to Cd. Then a rather straight-
forward algebra leads to
〈Ψ|MN (A,B)|Ψ〉= (N − 1)
N∑
i=1
〈xi|A|xi〉
+2
N∑
i,j=1
i<j
Re〈xi|B|xj〉. (A4)
By virtue of the assumption that A ≥ |B| and the in-
equality Rez ≥ −|z| satisfied for any z ∈ C, one has
〈Ψ|MN(A,B)|Ψ〉 ≥ (N − 1)
N∑
i=1
〈xi||B||xi〉
−2
N∑
i,j=1
i<j
|〈xi|B|xj〉| , (A5)
Since B is assumed to be a normal matrix it may be given
as B =
∑
k λk|ϕk〉〈ϕk| with {λk} being, in general, the
complex eigenvalues of B, while {|ϕk〉} its orthonormal
eigenvectors. Putting the spectral decomposition of B
into Eq. (A5), introducing aik = |〈xi|ϕk〉| ≥ 0, and
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taking into account the fact that |∑i ξi| ≤ ∑i |ξi|, we
obtain
〈Ψ|MN (A,B)|Ψ〉 ≥
∑
k
|λk|
 N∑
i=1
a2ik − 2
N∑
i,j=1
i<j
aikajk
 .
(A6)
It is clear from Eq. (A6) that to show nonnegativity of
〈Ψ|MN (A,B)|Ψ〉 for any |Ψ〉 ∈ CNd, one has to prove
that for all k the term in brackets in Eq. (A6) is nonneg-
ative. This, however, follows from the fact that
N∑
i,j=1
i<j
(aik − ajk)2 ≥ 0, (A7)
finishing the proof.
Lemma A.2. Let A =
∑d−1
i,j=0 a
j
i |i〉〈j| be a positive
matrix obeying TrA ≤ 1. Assume that each element of
A lying in ith row (and ith column due to hermiticity of
A) is close to 1/d in the sense that it obeys |aji −1/d| ≤ ǫ
for some 1/d > ǫ > 0. Then |aji − 1/d| ≤ η(ǫ) for any
i, j = 0, . . . , d− 1, where η(ǫ)→ 0 for ǫ→ 0.
Proof. The proof is rather technical and we present
only its sketch here (detailed proof may be found in Ref.
[26]). First, let us fix the chosen row to be the first one,
i.e., i = 0. Then, from the positivity of A it follows that
any matrix of the form[
a00 a
j
0
aj∗0 a
j
j
]
(A8)
is positive. Now, from its positivity we have that a00a
j
j ≥
∣∣∣aj0∣∣∣2, which together with the assumption that a00 and aj0
are close to 1/d and ǫ < 1/d, implies that ajj must obey
ajj ≥ 1/d−3ǫ for any j = 1, . . . , d−1. Taking into account
the assumption that TrA ≤ 1, one also has that each ajj
must be bounded from above as ajj ≤ 1/d+3(d− 1)ǫ for
j = 1, . . . , d − 1. Therefore, we have that all diagonal
elements of A satisfy∣∣∣∣ajj − 1d
∣∣∣∣ ≤ α(ǫ) (A9)
with α(ǫ) → 0 for ǫ → 0. Now, we need to prove that
the remaining off–diagonal elements of A are also close
to 1/d. For this purpose let us notice that from the fact
that A ≥ 0 one has that the following matrices
a00 a
i
0 a
j
0
ai∗0 a
i
i a
j
i
aj∗0 a
j∗
i a
j
j
 (0 < i < j) (A10)
are also positive. Since we can now say that all elements
in the first row (and column) and all the diagonal ele-
ments obey (A9), it follows, after some technical calcula-
tions, that aji has to satisfy such inequality, however, with
some other function which vanishes for ǫ → 0. Finally,
we have that any of the elements of A satisfies∣∣∣∣aji − 1d
∣∣∣∣ ≤ η(ǫ) (i, j = 0, . . . , d− 1) (A11)
with η(ǫ)→ 0 whenever ǫ→ 0.
Of course, we can always assume that the elements in
some fixed row of A is bounded by different ǫs. Then,
however, we can take the largest one.
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